The norms of our denominational doctrine are not 'norms' in some (sub-)cultural or 'social' sense; they are norms in an independent ontological sense. They can be obtained by interpreting a certain principle or a certain version of a certain principle. This is why we also call them "interpreted principles". The principles themselves are, again, independent of the cultural or social circumstances of a special time or place. If they are said to be eternal, then because they apply to all times or all eras; if they are said to be nontemporal, then because their significance does not depend on any time or era in particular. If they are said to be omnipresent then because they apply everywhere, that is, in all places and communities; if they are said to be nonspatial, noncultural or nonsocial, then because their significance does not depend on any place or community in particular.

The first two 'eternal', 'omnipresent' principles which every normative doctrine must recognize, explicitly or implicitly, are --as we have ascertained in the Book of Instruments-- the principle of truth and the principle of relevance. Neither principle, however, is metadoctrinal in that it inherently belongs to a second-order normative doctrine dealing with the relationship between persons and first-order normative doctrines. Both principles are (non-meta-) doctrinal in that they can, and ought to be, part of every first-order normative doctrine itself, altho this does not preclude them from being part of every normative doctrine of a higher order as well. Insofar as a metadoctrinal principle is concerned, our own ideology is in the first instance a first-order normative doctrine with (non-metadoctrinal) doctrinal principles. Later, after having discussed these doctrinal principles and the interpretations which we shall give to them, we will turn to the one metadoctrinal principle to be recognized in addition to those doctrinal ones. It is the principle which underlies the right to personhood.

The prime concern of every ideology is the ground-world and, more particularly, the way the ground-world should be. Being comprehensive, a denominational doctrine will also cherish ideas about the relationships between people`s utterances or theories and the ground-world and, perhaps, about the formal aspects of thoughts about the ground-world. Nonetheless, the ideas about these relationships and formal aspects are subsidiary to ground-world questions. Even if they were not, they would not add as much interest to the doctrine as ground-world ideas and principles, for in general all people pay lip-service to non-ground-world principles like truth (which governs the relationship between utterances and the ground-world) and consistence or coherence (as a formal aspect of theorizing). It is nonpropositional principles or, if interpreted, nonpropositional norms which characterize a normative doctrine more than any propositional principle or principle of correspondence.

It may now be rejoined that everyone will also say that `e is in favor of relevance, when asked whether `e is. No-one is likely to admit that `e aims at irrelevance or that `e does not care about relevance at all. This, however, is precisely the reason why the recognition of a principle of relevance does not mean much (if anything), that it is the interpretation of such a principle which counts, and the version adhered to. Altho this holds for truth, or a principle of truth, as well, the essential difference is that truth concerns at most a correspondence between nonpropositional and propositional reality, whereas (discriminational) relevancy concerns actions and attitudes in the ground-world itself. But then, we must admit too that the role of relevancy is only of fundamental significance for us in the ground-world. Consequently, it is the role of a nonpropositional principle of relevance which is of fundamental significance in a denominational doctrine like ours.