THE VALUES OF NEUTRALISM
The principle of catenated neutrality is a
principle of being, that is, of the
normativeness of being.
It is on this principle that
—or certain superior forms of (catenated) neutrality, to be more
precise— is a
performatory value in our
Since superior neutrality does not relate to acting persons in particular,
it is also a
The principle of neutrality actually colligates several traditional
nonagential values such as stability, harmony, equilibrium, and also
equality, under one universal value.
As a universal and axiomatic value neutrality is, of course, an
ultimate value as well.
And as an ultimate value it is also a
To sum up:
ananormatively superior neutrality
is as a value, firstly, performatory and nonagential and
secondly, axiomatic, ultimate and perfective.
An ultimate value is always perfective, but penultimate values can be
Furthermore, there are as many penultimative perfective values as
there are types of
catenas of superior neutrality.
It is the neutrality of every such type of catena which is superior to
concatenate unneutralities, and neutralness as a
secondary predicate is, as
it were, the common denominator for all these neutralities.
Hence, the neutrality of a
basic catena is a penultimate
value, and so is the neutrality of the
bivariant difference catena.
This latter neutrality, which is called "equality", is therefore a
derivative value which is
penultimate and perfective.
But there is, in turn, a great variety of bivariant difference catenas,
and specific types of equality are antepenultimate or of a lower
Yet, however low their derivative level, they remain perfective.
The positivity of any neutrality-differentiation or
-time-differential catena is
a corrective value from the ananormative standpoint.
In general this kind of positivity is a penultimate value.
The positivities of 'the' neutrality-differentation catena and of
with respect to time are, then, antepenultimate as values per se and
penultimate as corrective values.
Any state of being, force or act which causes positive
neutrality-differentiation, that is, a decrease of polarity, is an
The relationship between an instrumental value and a corrective or
perfective value is of a physical or empirical nature.
Hence, it is on the basis of scientific knowledge or empirical assumptions
too that we can be justified in considering a certain state of being,
force or action valuable.
nanaic refers both to what is
neutral-directed from a purely
catenical perspective and
to what is neutral-directed from an empirical perspective.
Nanaicity in general is a penultimate ananormative value, whether
it is corrective or instrumental.
Corrective nanaicity is nothing else than the kind of positivity already
mentioned as a penultimate value.
(Note that, if the distinctions are made, nanaic stands to
nanapolar as neutrally catenal to
neutral in the strict sense, since it is the
primary thing itself which is
nanaic, while the predicate this thing has is nanapolar.)
Ananormative values such as neutrality, equality and nanaicity are
nonagential and apply both to the material and to the nonmaterial
ground-world, both to nature
and to nonnature (or 'culture'), both to personal and to nonpersonal
For example, not only is the action of a person who promotes some form of
superior neutrality nanaic, but also a physical force like the force of
gravity is nanaic.
Nonetheless, a physical force is nanaic or not, whereas a person's action
which is not nanaic was, perhaps, intended to be nanaic (or, if it
is nanaic, was, perhaps, even not intended to be nanaic).
That is why
the Book of Instruments teaches us to
distinguish performatory values from
intentional and motivational
values, and performatory ethics from decision-theoretical ethics (in
So far we have only listed performatory values.
The nonperformatory ananormative value which plays a role too is
'anafactiveness' or 'anafaction'.
(The form -factive in anafactive is an adjectival combining
form meaning making or causing; for -faction in
anafaction compare benefaction.
We will see later under what conditions benefaction is a special type of
Anafactive means having the intention to be neutrally
catenal or nanaic. If having the intention is indeed the only
thing that counts, the value concerned is purely intentional.
This is intentional anafactiveness or anafaction. Strictly
speaking, the motive of a person's action or behavior could then
still be something else than neutrality. To make sure that
neutrality or nanaicity is also the moral decision-maker's
motive, one could speak of "motivational anafactiveness".
Anafactiveness in general is a decision-theoretical value,
intentional anafactiveness an intentional, and motivational
anafactiveness a motivational value. What is motivational
anafactiveness in neutralism is 'virtuousness' or 'a virtue' in
terms of traditional morality.
However, anafactiveness is an uncontaminated word, unlike the
skewed virtue, which is stained by ancient androcentrism.
It needs no further explanation that the main values of
neutralism are perfective neutrality proper, nanaicity or
nanapolarity and anafactiveness.
Something that is neutrally
catenal (and ananormatively
superior) is not nanaic with regard to the same catena and, even if it is
a person, need not be anafactive; something that is nanaic is not neutrally
catenal with regard to the same catena, and need not be anafactive either;
and a person who is anafactive need not be neutrally catenal, nor act
nanaically, with regard to the same catena.
Clearly, neutrality, nanaicity and anafactiveness are really three
In the end it is neutrality
tho, which is the
ultimate value: nanaicity, nanapolarity and anafactiveness are 'merely'
It might be objected that nonultimate values like nanaicity and
anafactiveness are still very general and 'abstract' neutralistic values.
That they are as general as they can be is correct, yet we will not
continue our analysis here with a discussion of antepenultimate and
lower-level derivative values.
First of all, our present subject is the values of neutralism as
We could, for example, take equality as a penultimate perfective value and
discuss the different types of equality as antepenultimate perfective
values, but such would amount to a treatment of the values of
Naturally, egalitarianism (if relevantistic) is part of neutralism, but
—and this is the second reason— we will treat of equality and
the principle of equality, and of a number of other, 'more concrete' values
and principles later in this chapter, and in the chapters following.
There is another question, also a rather 'abstract' one, which demands our
It is To what does one commit oneself by recognizing an ananormative
value or goal?.