There is no need to distinguish the having of parts from
the having of attributes and the having of relations. (If it
is believed that attributes or relations do not exist, then the
having-of-attributes-or-relations does not exist either, and
also then the result is still one type of having: having-as-an-element.)
This having is purely factual and in this sense not different from the
having in having a pen, having paper and
having a table where these objects are actually near at hand,
or used. A fundamental difference lies in the logical necessity
to have something one is made up of, that is, a body or (if
preferred) a mind. In the sense of having-as-an-element one
must have something, if not a part, then at least one attribute
or relation; otherwise one would not even be identifiable. In
the sense of being-close-to, owning, and the like, having is
a contingent matter: one need not have anything in anyone of
these senses. If both types of having were not distinguished,
one could not even tell anymore who you were. Are you a set of
which a pen is an element, or are you a whole which consists of
a piece of paper among other things? The table you have has four
legs, but do you have these four legs in the same sense as you
probably have two legs? The answer is no, because whereas all
these objects (other than your two legs) may be owned by you, or
had in some other sense, they are not elements of yourself.
Maybe one also feels 'physically close' to one`s body or its
parts, and to the attributes and relations one has; maybe one
'controls', 'keeps' or 'uses' them in a sense; yet, this would
all be in addition to having them as an element (of oneself).
Furthermore, one may feel that one has one`s (own) body in the
sense that one owns it, that it is one`s personal property. This
use of having lays claim to a cultural or subcultural norm or
law, or to a normative institution believed in, such as that of
natural or human rights. But then --again-- one does not only
'have' one`s body in the factual, noncultural (and nonlegal)
sense of having as an element, one also `has` it in the
logically contingent, normative, cultural or legal sense.
The conceptual framework we shall use as the supporting
structure of our thought will allow for one relation of
having-as-an-element, that is, for things having both parts and
attributes and relations. We shall also employ the term existence
(or being) in such a way that attributes and
relations exist, or rather can exist (but not necessarily as
things). For those speaking the language which is our present
means of communication here this may all sound very trivial.
However, it is philosophical analyses and formal systems which
exclusively recognize the having or possession of (component)
parts, or exclusively the having of attributes or properties
(whether or not in addition to two- or more-place relations)
which force us to state our basic assumptions explicitly. Altho
we did try and shall try to avoid deviating from traditional
language and its presuppositions as much as we can, traditional
language is never an argument by itself, because it may be
incoherent, ambiguous, wrong or immoral in its terminology and
assumptions (as it not seldom is). Thus we shall accept the
having of parts, attributes and relations as one kind of having,
but we shall not consider the having of extraneous objects, or
things looked upon as being extraneous, to be identical to it.
And altho we do recognize abstract entities as existing besides
concrete ones, we shall later reject as pseudo-entities many (if
not most) attributes and relations implicitly recognized in
ordinary or traditional language.
It cannot be proved that a certain ultimate conceptual
framework --or 'ontology' for short-- is the best one, or the
sole adequate one, as an ontological framework is itself a
prerequisite for any logical proof. It can be illustrated,
however, that constructional systems which only recognize the
existence of wholes and parts, or only that of attributes or
relations, suffer from the conflation of having-parts and
having-attributes-or-relations just because they neglect the
presence of the one or the other category. The illustration of
this shortcoming can only be done within our own frame of
reference tho, and could therefore be consistently dismissed by
others.
Whatever the disadvantages of our own conceptual supporting
structure, it will show to be very useful. In spite of this, the
edifice we are going to construct can stand without it, and
could also be erected with the help of a different scaffolding.
There are hardly any logical objections which can be made to our
constructional system, but some might reject our choice from an
ontological or some (other?) metaphysical point of view. And
while we have no absolute pretensions with respect to our
ontology, we must be prepared to meet the criticisms of those
who have.