BOTH CONSEQUENTIALISTIC AND DEONTOLOGICAL,
To overcome the more or less notorious situations in
which pure deontology turned out to provide no substantive
normative directive, or to be too meager a doctrine on its own,
deontology has been mixed by some with consequentialism. And to
overcome the more or less notorious situations in which utilitarianism
turned out to provide the wrong normative directive,
or, similarly, to be too meager a doctrine on its own, this form
of pure consequentialism has been mixed by some with deontology.
So, a theory may be deontological in that it recognizes, and in
the way it interprets, a principle of justice, and consequentialistic
in that it recognizes a principle of utility or
beneficence. Such theories have been classified as "mixed
deontological", but this expression is as confused and partial
as the message mixed male when used by an informant
to describe the makeup of a group consisting of both female and
male, moral agents.
Deontology is also used by many ethical theorists to
denote any normative doctrine or theoretical complex which is not
entirely consequentialistic and future-regarding in every respect.
However, this terminology bypasses the following division of
nonmotivistic normative theories into
three classes, namely:
- value- or goal-based theories
(consequentialistic if only future-regarding);
- duty-based theories
(to be classified as "deontological" by us);
- right(-duty)-based theories
(not to be classified as "deontological" by us).
Just as in deontology an act can be right regardless of its consequences
with respect to a
performatory value, so can in a
right-based theory someone or something have a right, not only
regardless of the consequences of being given that right, but
also regardless of fulfilling a deontological duty. If respecting
a right had bad consequences, or if in exercising
this right a consequentialistic or deontological duty were not
fulfilled, the person or being in question could have this right
nevertheless on the account of a right-based theory.
The concept of right is so important in normative philosophy,
and the role of value-based or duty-generating principles in
relation to the ethics of rights so delicate, that we will
devote the following chapter to this subject.
When we eventually opt for a goal-based doctrine which is not only
future-, but also present- and past-regarding, it is our right to
turn to such a form of
teleology which morally enables us to
personally do so.