1.4.2 |
PEACE INSTEAD OF WAR |
One may assume that no country starts a war merely because it likes to
fight, unless it is ruled by a mad dictator; and that no country starts a
war merely because it has to fight ('unless' its arms industry has
obtained so much power that it can force the country into war in order to
boost its own sales figures).
Whatever the reason that a country is involved in a war, it will
always have some rationalization for its conduct. Such a
rationalization may formally replace the desire:
- to attack a different political and/or socioeconomic system
- to spread the established
denominational ideology and/or
to prevent another ideology from freely gaining more and more support
- to subjugate a national, racial, ethnic or linguistic community
considered inferior
- to expand territory and/or to increase the power and wealth of the
ruling class, and, perhaps, also the rest of the nation.
Each of these 'justifications' prepares
citizens for war.
The desire to attack people with a different political
or socioeconomic system may be rationalized by referring to
'their' desire (fictitious or not) to destruct 'us', by
referring to the economic malaise 'their' system is in, by
referring to the lack of personal freedom or to the exploitation
occurring in 'their' society. In a process of political indoctrination
the citizens are continuously confronted with the
shortcomings and excesses of the politics and economics of the
enemy or potential enemy. The dangers of their system are
underscored again and again, thus making the citizens ready for
war when needed. "We want peace, but they do not want it!"
To remain level-headed under such circumstances would probably
mean that one would be able to distinguish advantages and
disadvantages of both economic systems, that one would recognize
certain defects in both political or economic systems, and that
one could accept the idea that one politico-economic system
might be better for one country, while another system might
better suit another country, at least temporarily. But in
societies which are getting ready for war, any degree of
objectivity is taboo, because someone who would see any advantage
in the system of the enemy (even when overshadowed by its
disadvantages), or who would dare to point at any comparable
drawback of 'er
own system (even when offset by its advantages),
would be regarded as collaborating with 'the enemy'.
In such an atmosphere all information about people's own side is
interpreted in a way that it answers to their positive expectations, while
information about the other side has to answer to their negative ones.
There is much similarity between the desire to attack a
different political or socioeconomic system and the desire to
attack a different religious or denominational system, but there
are some important differences too: the ideals for which people
are willing to fight are likely to be conceived of as 'higher'
than any other ideal. The fear of a different denominational
ideology can be stronger than any other fear of a different
system, while the rationalization of religious warfare may be more
outrageous than any other rationalization of warfare.
History has proved but too often that it can be sufficient in a religious
conflict to brand others as "pagans", "infidels" or "atheists" in order to
sanction an attack on them without any need for 'further' consideration.
But more often than not, a difference in religion, or denomination in
general, has coincided with a different political, economic, racial, ethnic
or linguistic identity, and it is this difference in identity which may be
used as a more rational cover-up in place of the recognition of
the denominational incompatibility of the rival communities,
both in civil and international wars. Even when a nondenominational
argument was or is used as a pretext of attack, the
attackers may not refrain from openly expressing the gaudy
belief that the supreme being (or 'God') would be there to
exclusively save their nation and head of state (especially when
this is a monarch), thus betraying that
theodemonism certainly
has to do something with the conflict in question.
While the desire to fight a different political or denominational system
may be one cause of conflict, the desire to oppress people who are
regarded as inferior, is another one.
The more doubtful certain individuals are about their own status and
the more life leaves them with feelings of insecurity, the
stronger their need will be to strengthen their own identity by
degrading others. It is by looking down on others that these
individuals believe themselves to be placed on a higher footing.
When the object of degradation is another racial, national,
ethnic or linguistic group, this can readily lead to serious
conflicts. And again, it is seldom or never possible to
completely separate these conflicts from concurrent political,
socioeconomic and religious or mixed religious-irreligious
differences.
The fourth cause of conflict on our list is the desire to
expand territory. A larger territory means more resources; more
resources means a wealthier country; and a wealthier country
means more power for the ruling class and, perhaps, more
prosperity for all, or most, classes. This in itself can be
believed to be a sufficient reason (and has in colonial times
definitely been a sufficient reason) for the rulers of a country
to subjugate foreign territories. However, the land-hungry
aristocrats, politicians and others who gave themselves up to
these adventures, were but too eager to use nice-sounding
arguments for their territorial expansions instead of admitting
pure selfishness.
So would annexation of the foreign lands to the empire bring civilization
to the so-called 'savages' living there.
This 'civilization' was to be understood as conversion to the religion of
the shrewd conquerors, who brought with their sharp swords a potentially
even more violent book of words along: their Manual of Divine
Justification.
All civil and international conflicts are conflicts between
people who differ in one or more of the following respects:
politically, socioeconomically, denominationally, ethnically and/or
linguistically; and in all these conflicts the rival parties
show an exclusive attitude towards each other in one or more of
the following ways:
- by providing and allowing only biased information about the other
party
- by making inadmissible generalizations about the people and
the system of the other party
- by not treating members of the other party, or individuals
relevantly similar to them, as equal human beings, and in a national
context as equal citizens
- by not respecting the adherents of other religions, of religion in
general or of nonreligious denominations as persons
- by stimulating alienation from the other party (in a national
context by concentrating their own or the other party in certain little
accessible areas, in an international context by making travel to and
from other countries difficult or impossible)
- by claiming that their own party would have
Mono's or another principal
being's support in the conflict.
While all may claim to be in favor of peace, it
is this exclusive attitude which prepares people for war.
An exclusive attitude is not just reflected in a limited
number of sentiments and opinions which have a direct bearing on
a civil or international conflict, it is a fundamental inclination
by which a person or community more or less consistently
exhibits a pattern of exclusive beliefs, feelings and thoughts
in all fields. The correlation which exists between exclusivisms
is not necessarily a causal relationship (two of them may be
caused by a third factor, or a different third and fourth
factor), but the fact that the combination of inclusive sentiments
and opinions with exclusive sentiments and opinions leads
to inconsistence, implies that every exclusivism contributes to
the acceptance of other and more exclusivisms. Some relationships
are very obvious:
- providing and allowing only biased information on a certain
socioeconomic doctrine, for instance, is only one step away from
providing and allowing only biased information on a certain
denominational doctrine
- making inadmissible generalizations about a different race, for
instance, is only one step away from making inadmissible generalizations
about the other sex, about those with a different sexual preference or
about those who speak a different language or dialect
- not treating the members of an ethnic minority as equal citizens, for
instance, is only one step away from not treating the members of any
minority group as equal citizens
- not taking into account irreligious convictions in a predominantly
religious society, for instance, is only one step away from not taking
into account personal convictions at all
- stimulating alienation from disliked foreigners, for instance, is only
one step away from stimulating alienation from disliked fellow-citizens
such as those belonging to a different caste or social class
- believing that one's own party would have the exclusive support of
the supreme being —with or without capitals— in a conflict,
is only one step away from believing in the supremacy of one's own
nation, one's own language, one's own race, one's own class and one's own
political system.
Since conflicts are caused by the exclusive attitude of one
or both of the parties involved, every exclusivism is either the
cause of a possible conflict (and therefore of national or
international insecurity) or contributes to this cause, however
unrelated to such a conflict it may seem.
A society in which measures and beliefs which offend against
the norm of inclusivity enjoy official and
exclusive recognition is not only due to suffer from internal frictions,
but will also create the conditions leading to international conflicts.
Altho it may seem
that the internal frictions have nothing to do with the international
conflicts, they result from the same official sanctioning of
exclusivism.
To be more concrete, let us compare two ideologies, both of
which recognize a supreme being. In ideology A the supreme being
does not have the predicates of one particular race or sex, nor
does it have a representative on the planet Earth or elsewhere
who did belong or must belong to one particular race or sex; in
ideology B the supreme being has the predicates of a particular
sex and judging by its ('his') representative on Earth, also of
a particular race. In ideology A there is a second (minor)
principal being, but this embraces all races and sexes; in
ideology B this nonsupreme being is of the opposite (inferior)
sex, but of the same specific race. Ideology A is not exclusively
related to the conditions of any particular country or part
of the world; ideology B can clearly be identified with one
particular country and its neighbors. Now, which of these two
ideologies makes the greatest chance of being the cause of a
bloody, civil or international war in which different races or
ethnic groups will be fighting each other? And which of these two
ideologies makes the greatest chance of activating racism and
sexism? If there is a difference in chance, the answer to these
questions is obvious! But the answer to these questions would
not be different, if we asked which of these ideologies made the
greatest chance of having a one-sided view of socioeconomic
systems, of ignoring ethnic and linguistic minorities, of
promoting the acquisition of more wealth for oneself or one's
nation to the detriment of others. The next question would be,
which of these ideologies would make the greatest chance of being
the cause of any civil or international war. With the few
characteristics given of the two ideologies in this example, it may
seem entirely unjustified to think of an answer to this
question. But when we think of the interrelationship of all
inclusive sentiments and opinions on the one side, and all
exclusive ones on the other, we must conclude that even a small
number of inclusive features may be a sign of an inclusive attitude,
and even a small number of exclusivist features of an exclusivist
one. Since these attitudes are fundamental inclinations, the
answer to our last question is obvious as well.
Let us once more compare two ideologies, neither of which is
theodemonistic. Ideology A does not relate to any particular
social class, whether constituting a minority or a majority;
ideology B relates exclusively to a particular category of
social classes (which represents a majority, however). For
ideology A the public expression of different opinions and the
distribution of information from any source should be free, that
is, not excluded; for ideology B the free availability of
information and the expression of individual ideas in public is
not permissible if it contradicts its own dogmas. For ideology A
one politico-economic system (or variant of such a system) may
be better for one country, while another system (or variant of
the same system) may be better for another country at a certain
time; for ideology B there is only one acceptable politico-economic
system, irrespective of time and place. Which of these two
ideologies makes the greatest chance of being the cause of a
bloody, civil or international, war in which different social
classes or politico-economic systems (or variants of the same
system) are fighting each other? And which of these two ideologies
makes the greatest chance of stimulating the development of
internal and/or external (international) absolutism? If there is
a difference in chance, the answer to these questions is obvious
again! And it would be the same if we asked which one would
make the greatest chance of having a one-sided view of religion
(not even recognizing its denominational value), of subjecting
or ignoring ethnic or linguistic minorities, of promoting or
yielding to the fulsome adoration of political or party-leaders.
When we conceive again of the fact that even a small number of
exclusivist characteristics points to an exclusivist attitude (in
one of its many gradations), this is also the obvious answer to
the question which of these two ideologies would make the greatest
chance of being the cause of any civil or international war.
It turns out that the ideal of peace and peaceful coexistence
is formally entertained by practically whole humankind, but that
it is overruled by two types of exclusivist measures and beliefs
reflecting one and the same principal attitude:
- those which are the or a direct cause of civil and international
conflicts; and
- those which are not the or a direct cause, and are seemingly
unrelated, but which, in fact, contribute inadvertently to the emergence
of these exclusivisms.
Permanent peace and security can never be
attained and established so long as either or both of these two types of
exclusivist
practises and
beliefs prevail in any field.
