Freedom is not an ultimate doctrinal value in itself. It may be derived as a lower-level value from neutrality and inclusivity, but neither of these ultimate values can be replaced by it. Inclusivity, for instance, may entail intrinsic liberty, but intrinsic liberty (even liberty in general) does not entail as much as inclusivity does. From the inclusivist angle freedom is merely the absence of the most severe forms of direct exclusionism, that is, the bare minimum on the way to the inclusiveness of total nondiscrimination. So denominational freedom is the bare minimum on the way to denominational inclusivity; religious freedom is even much less than that. A country with denominational freedom can still be very religionistic, for instance. The state will in such a country not injure or imprison nonreligious people, or people of another religion than the established one, but it will confront them, day and night, with the institutions and symbols of religion, or of the favored religion, nevertheless. Unlike denominational freedom, both denominational inclusivity and the right to personhood forbid states and other inter- or non-ideological agencies to support and perpetuate one particular type of denominationalism, let alone to indoctrinate citizens with it. Hence, governments and people who speak of "respect for religious freedom" rather than for "denominational impartiality", because they prefer so or do not know better, have still a hell of a long way to go.

That exclusivist institutions and symbols are in actual fact but too often imposed upon everyone by the state or community in which people live is very regrettable. Yet, this is no reason whatsoever to voluntarily contribute to the perpetuation of their existence. Thus more than 50% in a 'democratic' country, or less than 50% in an undemocratic country, may foist a monarchist system in which one 'man' and 'his' family are granted extensive privileges, onto the whole of society. While they may fancily style the members of that chosen family "king", "queen", "prince", or what have you, everyone retains the extrinsic freedom not to participate in the practise --in their practise-- of referring to people in exclusivist terms. If one calls every other person in one's country who one does not know intimately by 'er surname, then one shall call every person of that particular family who one does not know intimately by 'er surname. No doubt, the use of monarchist or aristocratic titles is part of the perpetuation of familially exclusivist practises and institutions.

In a majoritarian polity 51% can 'democratically' impose any system on the rest of society, but no majority or minority can force individual citizens to believe in exclusivism and to talk in an irrelevantist fashion, least of all among themselves. Those who do that nevertheless voluntarily perpetuate the exclusivist institution. (Under a dictatorial regime one could, perhaps, style every male "Prince Such" and every female "Princess So" thus draining titles like these of all exclusiveness.) In an undemocratic country (including countries with a disproportional representation) 49% or less can force every citizen to pay taxes for the maintenance of a monarchist, religionist or party-political totalitarian system, however meretricious or obnoxious; but no 49%, even no 67% or more, can force neutral-inclusivist citizens to change their thoughts or to alter their language. Those who do in spite of this have their thoughts or their language knowingly colored by exclusivist, political or communal institutions do not care about equality and inclusivity, and do not deserve it.

Not only can people not be forced to change their thoughts and language, they cannot be forced either to provide information which is not pertinent to the issue concerned, even when legitimate. All of us have the extrinsic freedom to refuse to answer any question which is discriminatory in that the information is not relevant to the subject, or to the listeners, spectators or readers in general.

It is true that people do not only have the extrinsic freedom not to perpetuate, and participate in, exclusivist or extremist undertakings and institutions, but that they do also have the extrinsic right to do this. The point is, however, that those who want, for example, to speak of themselves or others in exclusive terms, and who want to have themselves financially supported or want to support others merely because of something like their ancestry or marriage ties, should establish and maintain such an exclusivist institution themselves. For their money they have the extrinsic right to do that, but they should not involve the state and other citizens in such a major manifestation of familial favoritism.

On the whole we as adherents of the DNI will certainly have more freedom than the adherents of most religious and political ideologies. Nonetheless, we do not have the intrinsic freedom to participate in, or to perpetuate, systems which are unneutralistic, exclusivistic or supernaturalistic. Neutral-inclusivity has to be attained or furthered in the first place by making use of our extrinsic right to noncollaboration and noncooperation. In the political domain this implies before all noncooperation with fascism, party-political totalitarianism, state religionism and monarchism. Those who collaborate and cooperate with people striving for these and other forms of polarity and exclusivity promote polarity and exclusivity themselves.