3.2.3 |
THE NORMATIVENESS OF 'PURELY DESCRIPTIVE'
THEORIZING |
Both descriptive and
normative theories (and also speculative or
statistical,
modal ones) need be coherent in order to
be valid, and both depend on a number of axioms which must be
accepted without proof.
But --it has been contended-- which
descriptive theory is 'true' can be empirically ascertained: it
is verified if it corresponds with reality (the
facts);
falsified if it does not correspond with reality. Normative,
ethical or moral theories --it is then contended-- cannot be
empirically verified or falsified. But this in itself is a trivial
truth simply following from what empirical means: capable
of being verified or falsified by observation or experiment.
The underlying suggestion is
tho, that there would be
only one true descriptive or
factual discipline, whereas all coherent,
normative theories would or could be equally 'valid' however
contradictory among themselves. In four steps it can be demonstrated
that this kind of factualism is in complete error, and
that every so-called 'purely descriptive' form of theorizing
depends as much on norms or normative choices as an adequate
normative discipline.
Firstly, let us agree that there would indeed be solely one
true, factual theory corresponding with reality as a 'unified
whole', and that all other coherent, factual or descriptive,
theories, and all incoherent ones, are false. This, then, would
be a fact and ... not more than that! (Strictly speaking, only
the true theory's correspondence with reality is a fact, whereas
in the case of false theories there is no fact, or the 'fact' is
a privative one.) It is definitely not a fact that an utterance or a
complex of utterances ought to be true or ought not to
be false: this is a norm -- a norm of correspondence to be
precise. Thus, as soon as someone assigns a higher value to a theory
which has been verified because it has been verified, or which
has never been falsified because it has never been falsified,
'e is involved in a
normative act or an act expressive of (the belief
in) a norm (if it is not to be a mere question of personal
preference).
The suggestion, however implicit, that a true theory or
truth is superior to a false theory
or falsehood requires or presupposes a normative principle of truth.
Hence, those who stress the need of empirical verification or
falsification, and who reject untrue, factual or descriptive theories
must also reject any and every normative theory that does not
recognize a principle of truth(fulness) even tho that normative
theory might be coherent.
Secondly, no descriptive discipline could describe the whole
of reality in all its details, and certainly covering law models
do not do that. (Isolated factual conditions as such do not
explain anything.) Every descriptive theory must confine
attention to those aspects of reality it deems relevant. In
itself it is simply a fact that some aspects or details are
relevant, while others are not. But as soon as someone assigns a
higher value to a theory or description which describes a
relevant state of affairs than to an irrelevant theory or
description, altho both theories or descriptions are true, 'e is
involved in a normative act or an act expressive of (the
belief in) a norm (if it is not to be a mere question of
personal preference). The inherent suggestion is that a relevant
description or
relevance is superior to an
irrelevant description or irrelevance, and this requires or presupposes
a normative principle of relevance. Hence, those who demand
a true theory or description to be relevant, and who reject irrelevant,
factual theories or descriptions must also reject any and every
normative theory that does not recognize a principle of
relevance even tho that normative theory might be coherent and
recognize a principle of truth.
Thirdly, something is only relevant with respect to a certain
entity looked upon as a goal, objective or value to be aimed at
(as we will see in
the chapter on relevancy).
To treat an entity (a certain point of a scale, or a certain predicate of a
catena, say) as a goal or objective is
a normative act or an act expressive of (the belief in) a norm (if
it is not to be a mere question of personal preference again).
This requires or presupposes
a normative principle which determines what the one or
more goals are (or should be) with respect to which something
is relevant or not. Hence, those demanding a true theory to be
relevant with respect to one or more particular goals, and who
reject factual theories irrelevant to this goal, or these goals, must
also reject any and every normative theory that does not
recognize a principle furnishing at least this particular goal,
or these particular goals, even tho that normative theory might
be coherent and recognize a principle of truth and one of
relevance. (An example of such a goal may be the happiness of all
happiness-catenal beings.)
Of course, it may be that the developer of a 'purely descriptive'
discipline will object that choosing goals is not
'er task at all, and that 'e 'has
to' leave that task to others. (Note that having to itself
is normative.) Yet, without this choice 'e cannot describe
anything in a relevant way, and leaving the choice to a
particular other person or group of persons is itself a choice
which is heavily value-laden. If the factualist actually leaves
the choice to the state, 'e chooses the goals of the state; if
'e leaves the choice to private enterprise, 'e chooses the goals
of private enterprise; and if 'e leaves the choice to a
community of egalitarians, 'e chooses the goals of egalitarianism.
Moreover, the factualist's work is not only of normative significance
with regard to 'er explicit choice of objectives, or clients, or
people under whose orders 'e decides to act, it is also of
normative significance in 'er way of classifying, in 'er terminology,
in the assessment of results, and so on and so forth.
Fourthly, of two true theories or descriptions which are both
relevant with respect to the same goal(s), the simpler
theory or description is superior to an unnecessarily complicated
theory or description.
It may not always be clear which theory or description is simpler in
practise but
simpler is to be understood as requiring a smaller number of
primitive notions and axioms or principles. Applying this same
principle of parsimony to normative theorizing means that a
coherent normative theory which recognizes a principle of truth, a
principle of relevance, and two or more principles furnishing
its goals must be rejected too if another coherent normative
theory which recognizes a principle of truth and a principle of
relevance has only one principle furnishing the same or the same
and even more acceptable goals. It does in no way follow from
this what that goal should be, or that there is one
ultimate goal. It does follow, however, that the original factualist
claim that all coherent normative theories would or could be
equally 'valid', independently of the existence and adoption of
descriptive theories, cannot be sustained.
We have started with drawing a sharp dividing-line between the
factual and the normative spheres, between fact
and value.
Subsequently we have discovered tho, how this distinction
becomes blurred more and more when not considering facts and
norms as objective givens in themselves, but when considering
thought about facts and norms, that is, factual and normative
beliefs or disciplines. Facts and norms themselves may be
entirely independent of each other, in our theorizing on facts
and norms, the normative principles of factual thought may not
differ from those of normative thought at all. The question
whether the normative principles of factual thought actually
recognized or presupposed are really the same as those of
normative thought is itself a factual issue we cannot deal with
here. Even if ultimately the norms of a 'purely descriptive'
discipline and of a normative discipline are necessarily the
same, the facts need not be.
