In trying to find some unity in the morassy spawn of
unconnected right-making characteristics and deontic rules,
the 'categorical imperative' and 'principle of universalizability'
have been proposed. According to the categorical imperative
one should 'only act on a maxim which one can at the same time
will to be a universal law'. This imperative was designed to
establish a monistic kind of rule-deontology. (Rule-deontology
holds that moral judgments should be at least implicitly based
on nonconsequentialist rules or maxims.) According to the
principle of universalizability (already mentioned in
5.1.2)
one should be able to universalize one's maxim, that is, if x is
right, then anything exactly like x in relevant respects
must also be right.
This principle
tho is nothing else than
a principle of
relevance turned upside down:
the moral agent
starts with the distinctions made in the maxim and is asked to
inquire subsequently whether these distinctions are perhaps
irrelevant, in which case the maxim is not universalizable, or
is lost when universalizing it.
To illustrate the impracticability (and naivity) of an
ethical guideline such as the categorical imperative, let us
consider a biracial community with races R and S, and let us
take two individuals in this community: A and B. A loves B, and
expresses this love in a physical way towards B. How to describe
this action so that it might fall under the categorical
imperative or some other rule? It might be said that 'A has
physical contact with somebody of the opposite race' if A
belongs to race R, and B to race S, or vice versa. (Opposite
is then used in the simple
antonymical sense, when A and B have
never heard and thought of other races than R and S.) Secondly,
it might be said that 'A has physical contact with somebody of
race S' if B belongs to race S. But thirdly, it could also be
claimed that 'A has physical contact with somebody
'e loves'
(or 'just likes to have physical contact with'). Now, what
maxim does the categorical imperative want A to will to be a universal
law? Should A wonder whether 'e can will that everybody is
allowed to have physical contacts with person or body B; with a
human being of the opposite race; with somebody of race S; or
with somebody 'e loves or likes? And if A rejects the idea that
all members of
'er community should
exclusively express their
love towards B, or towards members of race S (so that no-one
expresses 'er love towards members of race R), should 'e then
consider it 'er duty not to love B, or not to express 'er love
in a physical way? Naturally, the right answer is somehow that A
is allowed to express 'er love towards B in a physical way if B
does (at least) not mind, whether 'e be of the same or of the
'opposite' race, of race R or of race S. The categorical
imperative, however, is useless in ascertaining that this
is the correct description of the act or maxim in question. What is
worse, it has been demonstrated that a 'suitable' description
can always be found of any act. (It will be fun to apply the
categorical imperative to someone who has decided to practise
philosophy as a profession. And what if such a philosopher tells
a conscientious objector that if everybody in 'er country refused
to join the armed forces nobody could defend 'er country, and
the conscientious objector replies that if every moral agent
in the world refused to join the armed forces no foreign power
could and would attack 'er country to start with?)
In the first instance it seems plausible to infer from the
categorical imperative or the principle of universalizability
that one should not lie, and that the injunction not to lie is
the rule with respect to the truth of one's statements.
For if everyone lied, or lied when it suited
'im, lying
would not be possible anymore, since a lie can only work in a
social environment in which most people expect someone to tell
the truth. Yet, if a liar acts on a maxim at all, that maxim
need not be that 'e lies or ought to lie.
It might be, for example, --as has been argued--
lie when it is the sole way to avoid harming someone or lie when
it is entertaining or harmless.
Not only is it possible to get around the categorical
imperative by employing other or more detailed descriptions of
the act, in everyday life implications are also easily avoided
by a change in meanings of the terms employed: if telling a
(natural or supernatural) falsehood is entertaining and harmless,
it is no deceit, and 'may' (or 'must') not even be called
"a lie"; and if no-one expects someone to do something, altho 'e
has said so, it may not even be called "a promise".
It should have become clear that deontological theories, like
all ethical theories, need at least an implicit moral decision-theory,
an implicit principle of
truth and an implicit principle
of relevance. It should have become clear, too, that deontology
is doomed to remain a very pluralistic form of ethics with all
the ensuing difficulties (or conveniences?) of conflicting
ultimate duties. Conflicting duties or values are inherent in
every normative doctrine with truth as a principle besides other
ones, but when they can be reduced to the smallest number of
ultimate duties or values, they can, at least in principle, be
solved or avoided. The deontological agent who promises the
authorities to kill the first living being 'e will meet on 'er
return home, but who simultaneously has the duty not to kill,
for example, somebody belonging to 'er own in-group, has no way
whatsoever to determine what to do when the first living being
'e meets on 'er return home happens to be somebody of 'er own
in-group. To assert that killing somebody of one's own in-group
must be worse than breaking a promise, presupposes a higher or
more general standard of appraisal (happiness maybe?), and
presupposes that there is a higher-level duty to do what gives a
better result, or not to do what gives a worse one. To say that
killing somebody is worse than breaking a promise is to go by
some higher-level principle. If so, then it ought to be
revealed, even when it is merely that of adherence to the
factual morality of the past and present (a 'principle' all
lexical orderings of ultimate duties, values or rights seem to
be subjected to). In the event that the deontologist is not
capable of doing this, it is probably because there is no
normative one on the deontological reckoning. But then it should
be underscored that no conflict of duties may ever be created or
given rise to, however many ultimate duties may be believed to exist.
