As illustrated in figure I.8.2.2.1 the basic member of an extrinsic right-duty constellation is the first party's general right to do or not to do something. Because it is a right to do or not to do, to act or to omit, it does not directly correspond to any duty of the first party itself. (If it did, it would be either a right to do or a right not to do.) Such a right which does not depend on someone else's acting or duty to act is a kind of permission we shall henceforth call "an active right". (Some have also called it "a right of action" or "right in the active voice".) It belongs to the traditional class of 'negative rights' in that it is a right to a nonaction or forbearance by others. These 'negative rights' are said to correlate with 'negative duties', that is, (nonactivating) duties not to act or to forbear. Typical of an active right such as that of the first party in this constellation is also the element of liberty in it: the freedom to do or not to do as one pleases, or as one judges best. For those recognizing right elements it would therefore be a 'liberty right'. If the right to X or not to X, when the right-holder has a free choice, is called "a discretionary right", then the extrinsic right of the first party is such a discretionary right. (It is contrasted with a 'mandatory right', when only one way of exercising it is permitted.) A discretionary right is an 'exercisable right'.

Since the primary element is a general right, like all rights and duties in this constellation, it is a 'right against the world at large', that is, not against any particular individual or group. Furthermore, it is a right the bearer has (or would have), conceptually speaking, even if the act or omission 'e has a right to is not justifiable on the basis of a particular, teleological or other, doctrine. It is this kind of active, extrinsic right which is, indeed, a trump over specific goals, and which includes the right to be 'moral' or 'immoral' in terms of a specific normative doctrine (but not in terms of the principle or set of principles on which the justification of the extrinsic right itself rests).

The duty with which the first party's right to do or not to do something may be said to correlate is the duty not to interfere. Since this is a duty not to do something, we shall refer to it as a 'nonactivating duty'. (It is a 'negative duty' in traditional terminology.) Now, this duty is the duty of the other party playing a role in the same constellation, namely all individuals or groups meeting or dealing with the first party. We shall call this "the coexistent party", and as it is not a definite individual or group, it may be conceived of, again, as 'the world at large'. It is this extrinsic duty of the coexistent party which enables the first party to exercise its right.

Does the second party in an extrinsic right-duty constellation have any right itself? Yes and no. Yes, because the coexistent party has the 'right' not to interfere, and solely by the principle(s) of the extrinsic constellation itself nobody can force it to interfere with the first party's freedom of action. If forced to, the coexistent party, or every one of its members, can even claim that it has the 'right' not to interfere. On the other hand, the 'right' is mandatory and nonexercisable, or only a 'half-liberty'. Some theorists have not been willing to consider such a 'right' a genuine right at all. Unless it is a right to something advantageous (in an intrinsic general constellation), we ourselves shall label such a direct 'right' "a half-right". Since this half-right is nonactivating (like the corresponding same-party duty), it should not be referred to as a 'right of action' or 'active right', altho it is not passive in the traditional sense either. For us it is merely a question of definition whether a half-right is a right in the first place, because the one or the other choice of definition does in no way alter our conceptual frame of reference. Whether or not the coexistent party is believed to have a direct right, it ought not to interfere with the first party's right. And this norm is what counts in the end.

The coexistent party may not have any full, direct right as a coexistent party, indirectly it has the same right to do or not to do something as the first party. This is because the right is general and applies to all: it is reciprocal. Moreover, as there is no direct, same-party duty corresponding to this discretionary right, the reciprocity is unconditional, for the duty and right can be reciprocated for all concerned. This reciprocity entails that the primary right-holder has the indirect, general duty not to interfere with others either.

The direct duty, the nonactivating half-right and the indirect right and duty in an extrinsic right-duty constellation all derive from the first party's extrinsic right; they are created by this right, as it were. But what does this right itself derive from, except, maybe, from a more general or abstract, extrinsic right of the first party? If it does not in turn derive from another extrinsic right, it is fundamental and based on or justified by means of one or more nondoctrinal, normative principles. That is why it is extrinsic: extrinsic to a particular doctrine and its principles. For example, if a fundamental extrinsic right is somehow combined with a teleological or deontological system, it is extrinsic to that system. (If not, then it would be intrinsic by definition.) We will see later that the only sensible interpretation of nondoctrinal in this context is metadoctrinal. Every extrinsic active right to do or not to do something rests ultimately on one or more metadoctrinal normative principles.