We define god and demon as (infra)ideological, principal being conceived in violation of the norm of inclusivity. This means that a 'supreme being' is by definition a 'god' when the belief in such a supreme being is exclusivistic, but that it is not a god when such a belief does not violate the norm of inclusivity. Of course, it is questionable whether in practise the exclusivist content of theodemonical religion can be divorced from its supernaturalist content; that is, the violation of the principle of relevance from that of the principle of truth. But if not, this does not matter, since we reject the violation of either principle. It is merely for a deeper insight into the phenomenon of exclusivism (both contemporary and historical) that it it is very worthwhile to look at the belief in one or more gods and/or demons as an aspect of exclusivist ideology. Predicates which are exclusively or disproportionately attributed to the supreme being or to gods (and their heavenly abode) do, then, implicitly receive a high value, whereas predicates which are exclusively or disproportionately attributed to a devil or to demons (and their hellish realm), or to nothing at all, implicitly receive a low value. This may seem relevant when the predicate is a value-laden one like goodness itself, but it is questionable in some cases and extraordinarily wicked in too many other cases. Whether the operation is a divine one, like supreme exclusivism, or a demonical one, like devilish exclusivism is, then, irrelevant. When the theodemonist wants to debase a certain characteristic or thought, or to humiliate a certain group of people, 'e can either do this by exclusively associating it with the demonical and with divine abomination, or by exclusively associating the complement of that characteristic, thought or group of people with the divine and with what exorcizes the demonical. The direction in which the effects work is the same in both cases. It follows that demonical exclusivism is in itself no greater or lesser evil than divine exclusivism, and vice versa.

We have now touched on a complicated subject, namely the gravity of the operations or manifestations of exclusivism. It is obvious that from the angle of relevance exclusivisms are equally objectionable when the number of nonrelevant distinctions and the degrees of under- or overvaluation are the same. Yet, from the point of view of personhood, for instance, murdering someone is a much more serious mode of exclusion than, for example, speaking about someone in derogatory terms. From the point of view of happiness catenality an act of discrimination which does cause suffering (or more pain than pleasure on the whole) is more serious as it causes (on balance) more suffering or a more intense suffering. And from a conceptual denominational perspective exclusivism inherent in a conception of the supreme being is the most serious of all modes of exclusion or exclusivity, and therefore rightly deserves the name supreme exclusivism in more than one sense of supreme. Evidently, the gravity of a nonrelevant distinction drawn depends on a number of considerations. Altogether it depends on the whole normative doctrine espoused. As we are still in the process of developing such a doctrine, it would be premature to say much more about the gravity of exclusivist manifestations at this place. Moreover, exclusivisms as exclusivisms (and thus discrimination as discrimination) may indeed be judged from the sole standpoint of the norm of inclusivity. It is infringements of people's personhood which should be judged from the standpoint of the right to personhood as infringements of people's personhood; and it is suffering which should be judged from the standpoint of a happiness-catenary principle as suffering.

When our survey shows that the tree of life does not thrive in a morass of exclusivism, there is hardly any need for explaining that people are bound to suffer too in such an environment.