2.1.5 |
OPERATIONAL MANIFESTATIONS |
In
section 1.2.2 three ways have been
mentioned in which every type of discrimination may be manifested: an
intermediary, an
affirmative and an
exemplary way.
Words like way and type are still very vague, but now we can
be more precise: the intermediary, affirmative and exemplary manifestations
of
componential,
dimensional or
integral exclusivisms are their operational
manifestations.
They differ in the agency
thru which the
exisms operate, that is, in the manner of taking
effect.
If there is no intermediate agency thru which a componential or
higher-level exclusivism operates, or produces an effect, the exclusivism
is either affirmative or exemplary.
(Both of them are therefore 'nonintermediary operations'.)
As mentioned before: in the case of an affirmative manifestation of
exclusivism a distinction need in principle only be made once.
If it is active and
abnegational, it is a form of
exclusionism.
The antithesis of this is integrationism.
In the case of an exemplary manifestation of exclusivism it
is an unequal or disproportional frequency distribution which
betrays the fact that a nonrelevant distinction is made or
present in a certain sequence of examples, actions or occurrences.
Nonetheless, also in an exemplary operation the object
of exclusivism is literally the immediate object of exclusion or
exclusivity.
We are not going to subdivide the exemplary operations of exclusivism any
further, but there is one affirmative operation which deserves some
special attention here, namely existential exclusivism.
This is an operational manifestation of exism in which something in the
universe is made exclusive (if
aggrandizemental) by regarding it as the
sole reality, or in which something is excluded (if abnegational) by not
regarding it as part of reality (while its existence is at least as
plausible as that of qualities or classes which are taken to exist).
Typical examples are those of philosophers or other people who claim
that everything is material or that everything is nonmaterial,
if not a dream; and those of politicians or other people who
claim that there are no members of a certain political,
denominational or sexual orientation living in their country.
(These latter cases are actually hybridisms of nationalism and
certain kinds of existential interideological exism or existential
erotic exism.)
In the event that an exclusion or exclusivity takes place with the
intermediary of language, the symbols or norms of a
denominational doctrine, or
other such agency, it may be labeled "an intermediary (operation of)
exclusivism".
Altho there are
innumerable ways of excluding something or someone, or of making
something or someone exclusive, it is of paramount importance to
recognize that there are many intermediary manifestations of
exclusivism besides its affirmative and exemplary ones.
For example, a certain exclusive theory or
practise may have
infiltrated into the language, or a certain exclusive attitude
may dominate a particular ideology.
To fight sexism, ethnocentrism and all other forms of integral exclusivism
is also to fight the intermediary manifestations of sexism, ethnocentrism
and all other forms of integral exclusivism.
When it is language which is the transmitting medium, we
will call the intermediary exism "a lingual (operation of)
exclusivism". (Such a lingual exism must not be confused with a
'linguistic exclusivism' which is an integral exism with language,
or something linguistic, itself as object.) One of the
processes underlying lingual exism is 'semantic generalization'
by means of which emotional responses are said to be generalized
not only from objects to words, but also from words to objects,
and from words to other words with similar meanings. It is
generally agreed upon that the emotional components of beliefs,
or of attitudes, can be created by the emotive connotations that
words and phrases transfer along with their meanings. And that
without the subject even having to come into contact with the
object itself. The lingual transmission of emotional responses
is but one aspect of lingual exclusivism.
Also the grammar and general vocabulary of language itself can convey,
and continue to convey,
irrelevantist conceptions for a very long
period of time.
(In order not to be so indecent as to offend ad nauseam against
traditional standards of lingual,
inter- and infrafactorial
gender-related exism no examples shall be given here again.)
Whereas words normally refer to classes, names refer to the members of
these classes, altho the distinction is not always a sharp one and the
terms word and name themselves may be ambiguous.
Yet, what are doubtless names are traditionally often being used to refer
to individual persons and (animals treated as) pets, and to geographic
spaces and objects in these spaces.
When any of these names manifests a form of exclusivism, it is a form of
onomastic exclusivism, another lingual intermediary operation.
The most pronounced kind of onomastic exclusivism is the brand in which the
name of one private individual with a real or reputed exclusive status is
made a prominent part of the name assigned to a public space or object.
It is, then, not the choice of a name in the name by itself which is
exclusivistic; it is rather the particular use of the name of one
individual to the exclusion of others which is.
Such an exclusion need not be complete, as in the case of affirmative
exclusivisms; it may also lie in underrepresentation, as in the case of
exemplary exclusivisms.
Naming a public or non-human-made thing after a particular (group of) human
individuals may be an onomastically exclusivistic act, such a facile, if
not vulgar, way of name-giving also displays a lack of verbal imagination
where a functional name would be much more practical, where a scientific
name would be much more educational, where a philosophical name would be
much more interesting and where a poetic name would be much more
euphonious.
A second intermediary operational manifestation we should
distinguish is 'the emblematic (operation of) exclusivism'.
This is the effectuation of exclusivism by means of emblems,
that is, objects or figures of objects which symbolize and
suggest another object or idea, or symbols, figures or devices
adopted as identifying marks. The object or idea suggested may
be exclusivistic itself, but it may also be that the use of
the emblem as such is exclusivistic. In the latter case
emblematic exclusivism can also denote the use of a linguistic
or infraideological symbol. Yet, if, and insofar as, the symbol
itself is a means to effectuate, or a product of, exclusivism,
we shall speak of "lingual" and "(infra)ideological exclusivism"
respectively. A notorious example of emblematic exclusivism is
the exclusive display of the emblem of one particular ideology
by the state or another organization which is supposed to
represent people of different ideologies, or all citizens
regardless of their ideology.
(When such an emblem is ostentatiously put on coins or bills, the ideology
which is meant to profit from it is often a
theodemonical creation.
The irony of this situation is that both emblem and devil
derive from ballein: en-ballein, that is, (to) throw
in and diaballein, that is, (to) throw across,
slander.
And indeed, emblematic exclusivism is not only an instrument to impress
others with the power and influence of the reigning state doctrine, but
also a way to misrepresent and damage the reputation of those people and
beliefs which cannot be associated with the official ideology so
offensively emblematized.)
Also in a purely ideological context (which is not non- or
interideological) exclusivism can, and often does, operate in an
intermediary manner, particularly in the field of
denominationalism.
The kind of operations concerned here are
'infraideological (operations of) exclusivism'. (Note that
emblematic exclusivism is interideological if its object is a
type of ideology.)
When the intermediary is an ideology's
doxastic norm, or the
formulation or interpretation of such a norm, the operation will be
termed "normative" in
this Model.
An obscene expression of normative sexualism is, for example,
the theist commandment that the desire of a woman ought to be to
her husband, and that her husband ought to rule over her
(without the reverse being demanded as well).
Other norms are often formulated in a more indirect way, and albeit less
obvious, may express a much more serious (if not horrendous) form of
normative exclusivism.
Thus the 'Supreme Being' of a theodemonical ideology may order 'His'
followers to exterminate all people who do things he personally dislikes,
and who believe things he personally disbelieves.
The doxastic norm is, then, simply not to do or believe what is such a
god's abomination, however much his extreme, supernatural hatred may be
founded in favoritism towards what the authors of his own scriptures used
to be attracted by, or rather eschew, in front of their neighbors.
The form of intermediary exclusivism inherent in the norms of
theocentrist ideologies for which norms
are nothing else than products of a divine will, can hardly be distinguished
from that kind of operation in which not the theist norm, but the god itself
is the medium of exclusion or exclusivity.
Yet, in other respects the difference is a clear one, and therefore we
will indeed differentiate normative exclusivism and 'principal
exclusivism', of which supreme and nonsupreme, divine exclusivism
are not the only manifestations. Since the principal being
of an ideology is not necessarily a god, principal exclusivism
is of a higher classificatory level than the form of exclusion
or exclusivity which operates thru the belief in a divine
agency. In the context of exclusivism, however, denominational
principal beings are either gods (when believed to be normatively
superior) or demons (when believed to be normatively
inferior). But more important than this subdivision is the
distinction between the supreme being believed in and all other,
nonsupreme principal beings. Therefore it is supreme exclusivism
which should have the honor of being distinguished first, that
is, before nonsupreme divine and demonical exclusivisms. Supreme
exclusivism is found in a mono- or henotheist ideology which
projects (irrelevantist) exclusiveness or an exclusion onto its
supreme being, or onto one of this being's images or avatars. If
the supreme being or its incarnation(s) are believed to be
necessarily and/or exclusively, say, men, this is a supreme
manifestation of aggrandizing male exism (X.582.50.4.21). Moreover,
if they are believed to be necessarily and/or exclusively
male beings by males (especially the male authors of sacred
scriptures), this is a case of supreme self-aggrandizing male
exism (X.582.50.8.21).
Since we are, in this chapter, ultimately concerned with the principle of
relevance, and not with that of
truth, we will not consider the
question here whether the supreme being does really exist; and if so,
whether it is a human or anthropomorphic being (or something different
altogether); and if so, whether it is a monosexual being; and if so,
whether it is a male being; and if so, whether it is a man (and if so,
whether it is a father).
What we are presently concerned with is, firstly, that even if it did
exist, and even if it were a man, its being a man (and father and/or son)
would not be relevant (saving, perhaps, when artificially
inseminating virgins or mothers who have to remain immaculate).
Secondly, it is in the choice of the belief in the type of being
which is to receive the epithet supreme that the irrelevant
distinction is made of (only) linking maleness up with supremeness.
(And we are talking about supremeness, not just about something like
divinity or courtesy ladyship.)
This time the cladogram belonging to our classificatory survey
(figure F.2.1.5.1) shows both the
operational manifestations of exclusivism and the antithetical facets of
inclusivity.
For, unlike dimensional and componential manifestations,
different operational manifestations of the same higher-level
exism are usually antithetical to a different facet of inclusivity.
This is so, particularly because the immediate object of
exclusion or exclusivity may be different, even tho the ultimate
object is not. Thus the immediate object of an infraideological
exism is an ideological entity (such as a real or imaginary,
principal being or norm), of an emblematic exism an emblem or
similar symbol, and of a lingual exism a linguistic entity (such
as a word). Not only do these objects differ from each other,
they also differ from the object of the nonintermediary manifestations
which are the ultimate object of the intermediary
ones as well. Where the immediate objects of exclusivism are
different for operational manifestations, the facets of inclusivity
pertaining to them must also be different. Moreover, even
the 'objects' of nonintermediary manifestations are dissimilar
in a sense. However, when the object distinguished on a lower
level is itself the product of an exclusivist activity, there is
no facet of inclusivity to be subdivided any further. This is
the case when nonsupreme principal exclusivism (operational
manifestation 20) is subdivided into demonical and nonsupreme
divine exclusivism (op.man. 40 & 41). Here the antithesis
remains as it is: the nonsupreme principal facet of inclusivity
(operational facet 20) with the supreme facet of inclusivity
(op.f. 21), itself a facet of principal infraideological
inclusivity (op.f. 10).
