4.3.4 |
VERIDICALISM INSTEAD OF SUPERNATURALISM |
Proselytizing
supernaturalists love to pose
questions like How do you know that there is no life after death?
or How do you know that God does not exist?.
Such questions are hypocritical, because the supernaturalist does not
know the answers
'imself either.
Yet, such questions need not be inappropriate when a nonbeliever actually claims that
'e 'knows that life after death
and God do not exist'.
Naturally, many supernaturalists are entirely unable to make a distinction
between the claim or belief that something does not exist
and the absence of a claim or belief that something does exist.
They do not realize that it is one thing to be an
a(nti)theist who argues that a supernatural or
supreme being named "God" does not exist, and quite another to be an agnostic or someone who is not
denominationally interested and
who neither argues that something or someone by that name exists nor that
it or 'he' does not exist.
(For the agnostic and the antitheist the question of
Mono's existence is as relevant
as for the theist, but we will see that for us as
normists the question itself is
irrelevant on the highest level.)
The supernaturalist does not really have to be capable of
distinguishing between a belief that something does not exist
and the absence of a belief that something does exist.
What suffices for 'im in point of fact is that 'e can differentiate a
belief which 'e knows to be false and any other kind of belief.
The reason is that
'er
principle of truth merely requires from 'im that 'e do not lie; in other
words, that 'e do not contend and --for
'imself-- believe anything that 'e knows to be
untrue.
Supernaturalist
ideologies have no substantive
criterion whatsoever for the infinite number of cases that the
falsity of a statement cannot be proved.
What is worse, a supernaturalist in some position of power has only to
make sure that what 'e tells the credulous, or what 'e indoctrinates
dependent children and adults with, cannot be falsified or made
implausible in any concrete way.
Such is preferably done by means of expressions which have never
been univocally defined, and by means of proper names which have
never been assigned to particular individuals.
Thus a supernaturalist can utter, in whatever vein, the most absurd and
implausible statements without feeling forced to believe that 'e does not
take the truth seriously, provided at least that 'e does not lie
intentionally.
But this is, of course, the most narrow and egregious interpretation of
the principle of
truth one can think of and
subscribe to.
If truth were really such an extremely limited affair as
supernaturalist (and certain naturalist) creations cause innocent
human beings to believe, every person could say that 'e
will die tomorrow, for instance, because 'e cannot know today
that 'e will not die tomorrow. Every person could argue that the
world will end the day after tomorrow because no-one can know
today that it will not end the day after tomorrow. Every person
could claim that there is an all-beautiful being named "Dog"
living in a place or on a planet named "the nevaeh" (or an
all-ugly being named "Lived" being dead in a place or on a
planet named "the lleh"), because no-one can prove that Dog and
the nevaeh do not exist, and that Dog does not live in the
nevaeh (or that Lived is not dead in the lleh). These and all
suchlike flights of fancy are supernaturalist illusions and
delusions, however effective and 'natural' their dissemination
by the Ministry of Love or other such agencies may once have
been (or still is). And this is what truthful people must
reject, not necessarily because it is known to be false, but
because no sincere person has a reason to assume that it is
true, let alone literally true.
In the
doctrine of neutral-inclusivity
the principle of truth
is interpreted in such a manner that one should only say that
something is the case if one can prove that it is the case, or
if one can make it plausible that it was, is or will be the
case, or made the case.
This plausible must be understood in a scientific or otherwise
non-supernatural, realist sense, and definitely not in the sense of
millenniums or centuries old books which are regarded as 'sacred'.
It is also to apply to the supernatural or
theodemonical promises
and comminations in such books.
And if the truth of an utterance about the future depends on oneself,
then a way of making it true is not only by fulfilling a promise
or carrying out a threat, but also by not promising something or
threatening with something, when one is not able or likely to
make it come true. No narrower interpretation of the principle
of truth than this one can deserve the epithet veridical.
(Taking into consideration that veridical derives from
verus meaning true and dicere meaning (to)
say.)
Our neutral-inclusivistic respect for the principle of truth may
therefore be called "veridicalism".
Being the antithesis of supernaturalism, our veridicalism
shows in a fundamental preference of the plausible to the false
or farfetched. (The veridicalistic word is not made flashy but
well-balanced.) In literature and in other fields of art
fantasies do not have to be taken seriously, and utterances not
literally. In fundamental denominationalism, however, we prefer
to see the real world presented as a theater in which purposes
are unfolded which are, first of all, not sure nor likely to be
extreme, exclusive or extravagant.
4.3.4.0
TRUTH, RELEVANCE AND NEUTRALITY TOGETHER
Truth is
To say that something does have
what it does have,
while nothing else has it,
or while some have it and others don’t have it,
or while everything else has it as well;
or that something does not have
what it does not have,
while everything else has it,
or while some don’t have it and others have it,
or while nothing else has it either,
is true.
Truth is not sufficient
Reflections on truth cannot be separated
from reflections on relevancy.
Some might argue that truth
also involves the question
whether it is true or not
whether something is relevant or not.
That is true,
but relevancy also involves the question
whether it is relevant or not
whether something is true or not.
Everyone interested in truth
must always choose
between infinitely many propositions
and between true but different descriptions
of the entities involved.
The question 'e will always be faced with is:
What do i base my choice upon?
(Why assert the one truth and not the other?
Why use these words instead of those?)
The distinctions 'e draws
--for in choosing 'e does draw distinctions--
must then be relevant ones.
While the flat thinker of the past
sought for truth in isolation,
the round thinker of the future
will seek for relevance as well.
Truth and relevance
are not sufficient either
Reflections on truth and relevancy
cannot be separated from
reflections on the focus of relevancy.
Some might argue that truth and relevancy
also involve the question
whether it is true or not
whether something is a focus or not.
That is true,
but if truth and relevance cannot be severed,
the search for truth is itself dependent
on the prime focus of relevancy.
Everyone interested in truth and relevance
must always choose
'er own focus first in order to assess
what is relevant or not
with respect to this determinant.
The question 'e will always be faced with is:
What should this focus of relevancy be?
The person of the Norm will naturally opt
for a neutral determinant.
And if it is true
that there are overriding reasons not to opt
for neutrality in one respect,
'e will opt for neutrality
in another, more basic respect.
Only then will 'e accept polarity
in the former respect.
The person of the Norm will not seek for
truth and relevance in isolation.
'E will seek for neutrality to complete all.
And it is by realizing this
that truth, relevance and neutrality
become of supreme value together.
