4.1.2 |
THE NON-METADOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES
OF ONE DOCTRINE |
It is not only reasonable to speak of "one notion of
neutral-inclusivity", it is also
evident that there is no separate doctrine of
neutrality besides a
separate doctrine of
inclusivity.
In other words: ours is one doctrine of neutral-inclusivity.
A convenient and significant abbreviation for this doctrine is
DNI.
The norm of neutrality and
the norm of inclusivity are the
paradigmatic or immutable norms of the DNI; paradigmatic in
that they together wholly determine our
denominational paradigm or
potential paradigm, and immutable in that they are not capable or
susceptible of replacement or great change without ruining the entire
doctrine itself.
They are the sole, purely
ground-world norms or
principles, and as such form the kernel of our doctrine.
Of the principles which are not purely
nonpropositional, the
metadoctrinal one underlying
the right to personhood is no part of
the DNI,
altho it is part
of our
denominational system of
disciplinary thought (and
denominational 'doctrine' in a wider sense).
The principles of the DNI are non-metadoctrinal, that is,
doctrinal as opposed to
metadoctrinal.
The sole principle in addition to those of
catenated neutrality and of
discriminational relevance,
which is not purely propositional and part of the DNI, is
the principle of truth.
If we confine ourselves to the nonpropositional realm and conceive of
neutral-inclusivity as one
perfective value, the DNI is
ultimately a
monistic ground-world doctrine.
On the surface it may seem rather pluralistic with values such as
nondiscrimination, beneficence, symmetry, equality,
nanhonore,
truth and coherence.
But firstly, values like truth and coherence are not ground-world values;
and secondly, we have seen how the norm of neutrality starts from the
normative superiority of a
secondary predicate.
By taking a secondary predicate like neutralness as the value to be
pursued, many
primary values of different
dimensions can be subsumed under one supervalue.
Given the intimate connection between neutrality and inclusivity,
neutral-inclusivism offers therefore a monistic view of nonpropositional
reality, albeit not the monistic view of a system in which a number of old
and/or new theories are eclectically or haphazardly soldered together.
It is the one value of neutral-inclusivity itself which encompasses an
indefinite number of values of indefinitely many different dimensions.
Neutral-inclusivity transcends all these dimensions.
Those who have claimed that a complete normative doctrine must always be
pluralistic, while thinking of values supposedly being of the same
category, such as happiness, justice or equality, freedom and truth,
made a number of mistakes.
Firstly, they did not differentiate doctrinal and metadoctrinal values
such as freedom in a sense.
Secondly, they did not differentiate nonpropositional and propositional
values such as truth.
Thirdly, they did not realize that values which are of a different
dimension can still be subsumed under one supervalue if the former ones
belong to the primary domain, and the latter one to the secondary domain.
And fourthly, they confused
perfective values on the one
hand and
instrumental or
corrective values on the other.
Neutral-inclusivism proves that a ground-world doctrine can be monistic
without suffering from the serious flaws, fallacies and fancies of
monistic beliefs like utilitarianism, agapism and monotheism.
Yet, our denominational
ideology is not monistic on the
whole: what is to be added to neutral-inclusivism is a principle of truth
which is (partially) propositional; what is, in turn, to be added to the
DNI is a principle of personhood which is metadoctrinal.
The principle of truth is propositional insofar as it governs
the relationship between the ground-world and propositional
reality. Unlike the norm of inclusivity and the norm of
neutrality it is not paradigmatic since most, if not all,
lovers of disciplinary thought pay lip-service to some kind of
truth or principle of truth. (Adherents of certain monotheist
ideologies may thus call their supreme deity "Truth"; and
adherents of the same or other ideologies may thus call their
supreme newspaper "Truth".)
The recognition of truth as a value does not distinguish the DNI from
exclusivist and
extremist doctrines, but what does
distinguish it from those doctrines is the neutral-inclusivistic,
non-supernaturalistic interpretation of truth.
It has already been shown, and will be shown again, at many places in this
Model how much the supernaturalist
assault on truth, which has been going on for thousands of years, deviates
from the neutral-inclusivistic position on this value.
And this even tho truth in itself is neither neutral nor inclusive.
