6.2.3 |
THE THEODEMONIST PROBLEM OF WRONG PROOFS |
There is one vital issue which remains: if the existence of Mono and/or
Demono could be proved, then what the major
theodemonist traditions have always taught is no
supernaturalist
ideology but knowledge; or at least a form of
denominationalism which does not
systematically violate the principle of truth, even not when literally
interpreted.
And indeed, the existence of especially the first principal being has been
proved time and time again, but ... these 'proofs' have also been refuted
equally frequently. There has been the argument from design,
which claims that nature reveals an orderliness which would have
to be the work, not just of an agency, but of a personal agency.
(There are more modern, statistical variants of the argument.)
The flaws in this train of thought were already so thoroughly exposed more
than two hundred years ago by a philosopher more courageous than any
all-powerful designer that it has by now been thrown into complete disorder.
We shall not review
'er criticisms
here, but it is interesting to hear that one might as well
conceive of the world as a 'rude essay of some infant deity who
afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance'; in
other words: the work of a god who did not yet have any design
experience, and who chose to have eschatology make up for it.
(The manuscript in which these criticisms were laid down had to
be published anonymously and posthumously as its wisdom did not
serve the interests of the ruling party of defenders of orthodox
monotheism.)
Other proofs which have been produced to demonstrate the
existence of one divine being are the causal and ontological
arguments. The causal argument concentrates on the relationship
between causes and their effects.
It claims that there must be a first cause.
It is then 'self-evident' — in supernaturalist terms — that
this ultimate cause condition is part of Mono's ragbag of predicates.
For non-supernaturalists, however, the observable succession of events
described as 'causes' and 'effects' requires no ultimate beginning or end.
To say that it does is begging the question.
According to the ontological argument Mono must exist because the
idea of Mono exists, and the same holds, of course, for Demono.
This argument is the epitome of madness in the pathology of
theodemonical supernaturalism.
Saner theodemonists have already pointed out themselves that existence is
not a 'property' such as strength or wisdom, and that it cannot be part of
the definition of any concept.
The force of the idea or concept of Mono, or of a being which is perfect,
it is said, is not increased by thinking of it as existing, or by merely
thinking about it.
It is the distinction between the nonpropositional
ground-world and
propositional reality in our ontology
which comes to mind here.
After the defeat of the rational 'proofs' to establish the
existence of Mono, most of his adherents have fled atheism and
agnosticism by adopting some kind of fideism, that is, the
view that one ought to rely on faith rather than reason, at
least, in religious affairs.
Fideism started teaching that 'religious knowledge lies beyond the limits
of man's rational faculties', and for quite a while thereafter the
theodemonological community remained silent.
But did the bells of fideism ring the demise of all attempts at proving
the existence of Mono?
Maybe they did, yet the body which was supposed to be dead much
later turned out merely to have been in a state of suspended
animation: the existence of Mono has been 'proved' again. This
time it makes use of the most modern of logics; modal logics,
to be more precise. The 'proof' heavily draws on the concept of
supreme being and tells us that there is nothing greater than
the greatest, and that there is one who is the greatest, and
only one.
The philosopher in question does not know what 'great-making properties'
are —
'e only knows what 'e believes they are.
One of these properties would have to be power. Mono, being
the most powerful personal being in the world might thus happen
to be the president of the mightiest country (if male), or the
richest man in the most plutocratic country. Now, this president
or plutocrat may feel, and be treated, like a god, he might not
be very happy with the proof at all, for example, because his
political power or wealth needs an external justification, not
one in itself. (In this way he can always claim Mono's special
favor, since Mono never says anything to the contrary.)
Most monotheists might not be very happy with such a banal,
incarnate Mono either. Banal because the president or
plutocrat in question is not, or need not be, the wisest or most
intelligent person, let alone show the most exemplary moral
behavior. This takes us back to the crux of every theodemonical
belief: it is the content of Mono's omnium-gatherum of
great-making characteristics and the content of Mono's authoritative
judgments which count, not the real or imaginary fact that he
has characteristics (whatever they may be) or that he has spoken
(whatever he may have said). The theorist who creates a solitary
god by proving, however logically, that there must be someone
who is the 'greatest' or the 'king', regardless of what this
god's properties might be, presents a style of godthink devoid
of any content. One may reproach theodemonical fideism with one
of the greatest aberrations in human thought, but not for being
that trivial.
6.2.3.0
THE SPIRIT OF THE MOST EXCLUSIVE
When the innocent wondered how all came into being,
'he' would emerge as the sole creator of the universe,
and as a creator outside the universe.
When the innocent were not quite sure
of the existence of others,
his omnipresence would fill up every vacuum, and
his omniscience would take away every doubt.
When the innocent found out
that mind and matter could not interact,
he would be there
to put the pictures of things into every mind
at the right moment.
When the innocent could not understand
why there still was so much evil in the actual world,
his omnipotence would allow them to live
in the best of all possible worlds:
the one in which their virtue and piety could stand out.
When his nature was specified,
he would be exclusively human:
anthropopathic and anthropomorphic;
and he himself or his prophet or prophets
would be exclusively male at that.
When his extraction was described,
he himself or his sole or last prophet
would have arisen from one people:
the elect speaking the chosen tongue,
dwelling in or near the chosen town.
It is the image of this one being
which provided, or still provides, the satisfaction
for sexist, racist or other exclusivist desires,
and it is the image of this one being
which provided, or still provides, the pseudosolution
to a host of theoretical and practical problems.
However,
without removing the causes of discontent themselves,
and without adding anything to our knowledge
of factual, modal or normative ground-conditions.
In the main it was, or has remained, the Great Put-off,
a ubiquitous Mumbo Jumbo:
the Solution begging the questions
instead of answering them,
the Symbol causing the problems
instead of solving them.
Since the image of this one being was, or still is,
so infinitely multifarious,
'He' has many names, one be the Most Exclusive.
While the spirit of the Most Exclusive
has reigned over too many poor and oppressed people
in the past until today,
it shall not reign anymore over free and fearless people
in the future.
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