3.2.1 |
A HIERARCHY OF PROPOSITIONAL LEVELS |
In our ontological discussion of reality we have distinguished the
first domain of reality from the second and higher-order domains.
We ourselves and all animals, plants and nonliving, concrete things
belong to the first domain, whereas attributes and relations, and
catenas of attributes and relations,
belong to the second. We have now also distinguished
three spheres of reality which do not concern existence per se
but the nature of the relationship between existing things.
This encompasses the relationship between a thing and an attribute which
it has or does not have, which it can have or cannot have, and which it
should have or should not have.
In
practise this
triadic sphericity of reality only seems
to make sense for the first domain of discourse, for this is the
domain in which we as persons can exert our influence, and can
be influenced ourselves by what should be.
The ontological system we have developed is a body of thought
about existence, about reality. Until now it has been confined
to those things (real or hypothetical) which were not thoughts
or systems of thought themselves, and we have assumed that
this reality is independent of the thoughts about it. Hence, when
a person is (said to be) thinking about something, this thinking
itself does not make it exist, nor does it cause it to have a
certain part or determinative predicate — at the most the thing
may get a reflectional predicate as a result of this thinking (see
2.3.1). We vehemently reject the idea
that all existence, and all facts,
modes and norms, would be dependent of,
that is, immediately occasioned by, thoughts or feelings about them
(including sense perception). We even more vehemently reject
the solipsist idea that all existence and the factual, modal or
normative forms of reality would solely depend on 'my' mental
processes, or the anthropocentrist idea that they would all
depend on the mental processes of human beings exclusively. Thinking
may affect the existence and shape of certain things very much,
but only indirectly after subsequent action has been taken. It
is, then, the action which affects it, not the thinking itself
in a strict, direct sense.
From the perspective of the process of thinking reality
consists of:
- one or more persons thinking about reality
(having thoughts about what is, can or should be);
- thoughts (about reality as it is, can or should be);
- the reality thought about (the rest being the reality not
thought about).
As we have, until now, included into our ontological framework
only entities which are not thoughts themselves, we have not yet
left the lowest level of a new ontological hierarchy: that of
zero-, first- and higher-order levels of propositional reality.
The zero-level is, then, the level of nonpropositional reality
to which we belong ourselves as persons and as bodies. But also
predicates and catenas belong to this level, and facts, modes
and norms insofar as they pertain to relationships between
nonpropositional entities.
The term proposition will be employed here as a
synonym of (primary) truth-bearer, as something that is
true or false. This accords quite well with the etymology of the word
and (one of) its lexical meaning(s). It depends on which
theory of truth or truth-bearers one adheres to, whether a proposition
(in this sense) is the same as the meaning of a sentence, a
sentence, a sentence token, an utterance, a statement, or
something else of that ilk.
The availability of the concept of proposition is far more important here
than the question of its final formal analysis,
tho its use
might give the appearance of wholly committing ourselves ontologically.
However, all the claims in which we make use of the concept of a
proposition, or in which we differentiate the propositional and the
nonpropositional, are indifferent between the options mentioned.
Whether a proposition is something abstract, such as a thought or the
meaning of a sentence, or something more concrete, such as a sentence
token or an utterance, we can (and must) tell a nonpropositional reality
apart from a propositional reality. And, furthermore, it is
essential that such a proposition is always about something.
Propositional reality is the world of propositions or
propositional attitudes. Attitudes are hypothetical constructs in
which a person's diverse thoughts, feelings and tendencies to
act are arranged into a more or less coherent pattern. The
cognitive aspect of someone's attitude concerns
'er thoughts
and beliefs; the affective aspect the feelings
'e has about something;
and the conative, aspect the person's behavioral tendencies.
The expression propositional attitudes,
refers, first of all, to the thoughts and beliefs people have about
reality as it is thought or believed to be. We shall not exclude
the possibility that it also refers to people's feelings and
behavioral tendencies if, and insofar as, they are expressed in
or translatable into propositions or statements. Thus, verbs of
propositional attitude are not only verbs such as to know but
also verbs such as to hope and to intend. Propositional
reality is, then, also the world of feelings, intentions, conscious
desires and tendencies about and with respect to reality as it
is felt to be, intended to be, and so on. Thinking, however, is the
phenomenon most typical of propositional reality, and we shall often
only mention thoughts for the sake of simplicity.
In the first instance thoughts are thoughts about nonpropositional
reality, but they may also become the object of
thought themselves, and these thoughts about thought too may,
again, become the object of thought, and so on and so forth.
Hence, whereas there is merely one level of nonpropositional
reality from the propositional point of view, namely the
zero-level, there is in principle no definite number of levels
of propositional reality. Thoughts about nonpropositional reality
constitute first-order propositional reality, those about
first-order propositional reality, second-order propositional
reality, and so on. However, second-order propositional reality does
not only encompass thoughts about (or propositional attitudes towards)
thoughts about nonpropositional reality, it also encompasses
thoughts about (and propositional attitudes towards) the
special relationship between first-order thoughts and nonpropositional
reality. And this relationship may be factual, modal or normative,
like any relation within first-order propositional reality.
The beginning of this hierarchy of propositional levels is shown in
figure I.3.2.1.1. It is obvious
that when speaking of "lower" and "higher levels" in this
hierarchy, the words lower and higher must not be
given the connotation of worse or inferior and better
or superior. We could have labeled the zero-level "the highest
level" and every next level "a lower level". As in any objective,
theoretical hierarchy these words do not have any evaluative significance
here.
