1.3.1 |
THE EXCLUSIVE AND THE INCLUSIVE ATTITUDES |
We know already that several psychological and sociological
studies have shown that discriminatory attitudes (and beliefs)
tend to covary.
To prove, however, that the correlations hold for all types of
discrimination, or
infrafactorial exclusivism,
it is not only the conceptual apparatus of an entire
classification system of exclusivisms
that is required.
Even with such an instrument available, the conclusive proof will
have to wait until the first society can be studied which has
been free from any exclusivism for a number of generations. Can
we wait that long? The answer is No, we cannot, because it is
precisely by waiting for such an inclusive society to come that
it would never emerge.
Strictly speaking, we do not need any empirical presuppositions with
regard to correlations between exclusivist attitudes and
practises, and
we shall not pretend that we know that such correlations exist in the
ground-world. (However,
ground-world correlations in general must be distinguished
from the impact of exclusivist
ideology itself.)
Nonetheless, if the assumption is correct, it means that a particular
belief, attitude or practise which should be displayed according to
some
doctrinal principle
(the norm of inclusivity in inclusivism),
cannot be displayed, to a certain extent, when it is demanded
in combination with (too many) exclusivist beliefs, attitudes
and practises. Thus if (infrafactorial) exclusivisms do covary
strongly, every ideology or normative doctrine which propagates
a nonexclusivist ideal, but which simultaneously is founded on a
multitude of exclusivist elements of belief, is doomed to failure as far
as that ideal is concerned (but unfortunately, not necessarily
in other respects). This, in turn, may explain why quite a few
'universal ideals' have never been realized even after millenniums
of one exclusivist ideology's hegemony over large parts of
the world. It is therefore very worthwhile to take a closer look
at the plausibility of the assumption that the various kinds
of infrafactorial exclusivism do indeed lend each other support.
We shall first do this by discussing a number of
imaginary, yet quite realistic, cases.
To start with, let us consider a group of people of one race
who believe that their own race is an intelligent one,
altho
other races may be more musical.
They also believe in a supreme being or 'Supreme Being' that has (once)
exclusively revealed itself in the person of somebody of their
own race. What is, then, the chance that
these people at the same time are of the opinion that anybody of
any race should be eligible for any job or office, for example,
that of the president of the country? If the people in question
show a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, the
chance is nil.
Because of the fact that they find members of other races perhaps
musical but not intelligent, they will not expect anyone of a different
race to be intelligent enough for a position of authority over citizens
like themselves.
Because of the fact that they believe that the supreme being exclusively
revealed itself in a person of their own race, they will readily
associate their own race with supremeness and supremacy (if not
consciously, then subconsciously) and they will be of the opinion that
superior tasks should be assigned to superior people, namely members of
their own race.
The chance that the persons in question are for racial
equality in the occupational field, not only formally but also
in practise, while accepting all its consequences, may be expected
to be much smaller than in the case of people who do not
have the ideas mentioned (because their ideas are inclusive or
less exclusive). In the exclusivist belief of the former group
there always remains one office which definitely never was held,
and definitely never will be held, by somebody of a different
race: the office of the supreme being or its purported (onetime)
representative on Earth.
Let us now consider a man who thinks that physical beauty
only concerns women, or women and girls; that it is their task
to cook, to wash and to make everything look nice, including
their own bodies; he does not claim that males are ugly, but he
believes that boys and certainly men cannot (or should not)
distinguish themselves, or be distinguished, on the basis of
their physical appearance (other than the criterion that they should
not look 'feminine').
Let us assume that this man also believes in a supreme being that has the
characteristics of a male person, of a 'father' who rules the family of
'mankind', and that 'He' has exclusively manifested 'Himself' or has
manifested 'Himself' exclusively in one living person, namely a male
human being on the planet Earth ('His son' or 'last prophet').
What is the chance that he, at the same time, is
of the opinion that every man and every woman should be able to
occupy any post he or she is qualified for, such as the highest
position in his religious organization? Again, if this person
shows a consistent pattern of sentiments and opinions, the
chance is nil.
Since he judges women by their beauty or its absence, and not by their
technical or intellectual skills, he will easily attribute a lack of
technical and intellectual ability to them, and he would not like to see
them in high positions on account of it.
And since he refers to the supreme being as "He", attributing to 'Him'
all the characteristics of a male person, he will easily associate his
own sex with supremeness and supremacy (if not consciously, then
subconsciously) and he will be of the opinion that superior jobs or
positions should be given to superior people, namely men.
And again, the chance that this person shows no consistent pattern of
sentiments and opinions, that is, that he is for sexual equality in
the field of jobs and positions, may be expected to be much smaller than
in the case of someone who does not have the ideas mentioned.
In the man's exclusivist worldview there remains always one office
which definitely never was held, and definitely never will be
held, by a woman: the office of the supreme being or 'His'
purported representative on Earth.
The question of correlation does not only play a role with
respect to thoughts, feelings and tendencies in the same field,
it also plays a role with respect to thoughts, feelings and
tendencies in different fields. Consider, for example, a person
who believes that the office of head of state should be held by
someone who(se body) is the (male) child of the previous head of
state (somebody of
'er own race), and that certain
other people should be granted an (upper-class) state income on the
basis of their being related to the present or previous head of state.
Let us assume that this person also feels that complete nudity
is indecent, that certain (so-called 'private') parts of the
body should always remain hidden in the presence of other people
or bodies, except, perhaps, for a spouse and for pressing
(other) medical reasons. Let us further assume that this same
person has a great influence on the building of new homes in the
town or city where
'e lives, and that 'e uses this
influence to build family homes only, that is, homes for married couples
with children, altho many (if not most) households do not consist of
one male adult, one female adult married to him and one or more
children. What is the chance that this person is of the opinion
that anyone of any race should be able to get any job 'e is
qualified for? Altho the question of racial equality lies in
another field than that of family membership, nudity and the
composition of households, the chance is still nil if the person
considered shows a consistent pattern of sentiments and
opinions. Because of the fact that this person believes that certain
offices ought to be held, and certain incomes ought to be
received, on the basis of relationship only, the belief that
offices ought to be held, or for that matter, not to be held, on
the basis of race only agrees with this. Not being able to look
objectively at the phenomenon of nudity, and being subject to
purely emotional reactions of inhibition and fear, 'e would
similarly show a purely emotional reaction of insecurity when
confronted with people of a different race in a high position.
And as this person has no interest in people who live alone or
together in households of a different composition than (what
presumably is, was or will be) 'er own, 'e will have a lesser
interest in people who live alone or together in households of a
different race than 'er own, and more generally, in people of a
different race than 'er own. 'E will not find other races (or a
particular other race) as interesting and likable as 'er own
race, nor will 'e assign an equal importance to other races, and
accordingly 'e will be of the opinion that at least certain
exclusive positions (such as that of the head of state) should
remain the privilege of 'er own race.
The chance that the person focused on in this third example
will not show a consistent pattern, and that 'e will not have
racist opinions, sentiments or tendencies in any way, will be
smaller than the chance that 'e does have them, unless this
pattern is or has been upset by
interfactorially exclusivistic
effects. For example, if it is taboo in the community in which
the person lives to be a racist, or to openly display racism in
ground-world conduct, whereas it is not taboo to defend monarchism,
to be a prudist and to discriminate between households on
the basis of their composition, then it is obvious that the
correlation in such a community between racism and the three
other infrafactorial exclusivisms may be weaker or even absent.
But it is, then, weaker because it is counteracted by a force
especially exerted to mitigate or offset the ill effects of a
particular form of discrimination (say, when racism is not
merely taboo, but when exclusive antiracism has even become a
fashion). As soon as that force is not strong enough anymore, or
as soon as it has to be divided over too many fields in order to
counteract not just one but several infrafactorial exclusivisms,
the discriminatory beliefs and practises which once seemed
to have been quelled will reemerge.
It is not until that moment that correlations between exclusivisms in
completely dissimilar fields may indeed turn out to exist, even tho
they are (temporarily) absent because of an interfactorially
exclusivistic counterforce.
In theory the possible combinations of beliefs, feelings and
tendencies a person can have, and of the things 'e can do, are
innumerable. But each thought, feeling, tendency or action is
either exclusive or nonexclusive, however unrelated the fields
they belong to may seemingly be.
And if there is indeed a strong correlation between exclusivist beliefs,
feelings, tendencies and actions on the one hand, and inclusivistic
beliefs, feelings, tendencies and actions on the other, there are two
basic combinations, not only structurally but also in practise.
They are: the combination of all the former beliefs, attitudinal
components and actions which reflect the exclusive attitude;
and the combination of all the latter beliefs, attitudinal
components and actions which reflect the inclusive attitude.
Between these two principal attitudes there is a fundamental
divide. More or less consistently people exhibit either the one
or the other attitude in the things they believe in, and in the
way they feel and act. To the extent in which feelings and
thoughts about the world around them show a pattern of consistence
(an either inclusive or exclusive one) we cannot divorce
the way people deal with one facet of life from the way they
deal with other facets of life. Certain exclusive beliefs or
feelings which seem harmless on their own may in fact be
correlated with other exclusive beliefs or feelings which have a
pernicious influence on the attainment of cardinal inclusive
ideals. All exclusive beliefs, thoughts, feelings, tendencies
and actions, however harmless at first appearance, do reflect
one of the two principal attitudes: the exclusive attitude.
If an ideology is exclusivistic, it contains exclusivist
factual,
modal and/or
normative beliefs or thoughts;
it arouses or exploits exclusivist feelings; it creates or depends on
exclusivist tendencies; and/or it incites people to act in an
exclusivist manner, either by exclusion or by exclusivity.
Exclusivist ideologies are the product of exclusive attitudes
but once having established themselves, they perpetuate
these very attitudes (which by then can correctly be called
"exclusivistic"). Altho 'exclusivism' as an explicit ideology
in itself does not exist (yet), it is a way of thinking, feeling
and acting which has had, and still has, an enormous impact on
all aspects of human and nonhuman life, not only in its active,
infrafactorial form of discrimination, but also in its interfactorial
and passive forms. The absence of exclusivism as an ideology
in which the violation of the norm of inclusivity would be
an end in itself has been 'most generously made up for' by religious,
theodemonical, political
and other ideologies or traditions with out-and-out exclusivistic
contents and records.
