8.5.1 |
THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXTRINSIC
RIGHT-DUTY CONSTELLATION |
The question whether rights exist at all is little interesting from
the point of view of normative discourse, for sentences in which rights are
mentioned can always be translated into should- or
ought-sentences somehow — they may only sound less emphatic
(unless the depreciation of the right notion has already gone too far).
True should- or ought-sentences
do in turn correspond to (the absence of) a norm, whether a
supernorm, a subnorm or some intermediate norm. (While we have
already ascertained that the existence of norms, at least of
some norms, must be granted.) Statements about mandatory rights
can quite easily be converted into statements in which one or
more norms that one should or should not do something are
mentioned. For statements about (general) discretionary rights
this relationship between rights and ought-sentences may seem
less obvious, because in such statements reference is indirectly
made to the absence of both a norm that one should do X and a
norm that one should not do X (albeit merely the absence from a
'particular',
nondoctrinal point of view, if the right is
extrinsic).
In this sense the concept of a discretionary right
is clearly a privative normative concept, and therefore discretionary
rights do certainly not exist, strictly ontologically
speaking. Yet, in the language of normative discourse the
'existence of rights' is in principle a question of normative
philosophy or
ideology, not (or hardly) of ontology
anymore.
To say that 'a particular right exists' may there in one case
amount to an assertion that a certain norm or set of norms
really exists, in another case to the assertion that a certain
norm or set of norms does not really exist.
The question whether
intrinsic rights exist is of great
normative significance,
altho it must be
reformulated in terms relating to whole intrinsic
right-duty constellations.
If such constellations exist, then both intrinsic duties and intrinsic
rights exist. The idea that only intrinsic rights would exist,
or only intrinsic duties, is preposterous.
Now, as intrinsic right-duty constellations depend for their justification
on one or more principles of one or more particular (first-order) normative
doctrines, the 'existence' of these constellations (in a normative,
nonontological sense) also depends on those doctrines.
Therefore the question whether intrinsic rights exist,
can only be answered by us on the basis of our own normative
doctrine. However, as we will be primarily concerned with the
instruments and the preparatory development of our thought in
this book of
the Model, not with unveiling the
fundaments of the doctrine itself, this is not an appropriate place
to discuss that issue. We will consider the existence and contents of
intrinsic rights and duties in
the Book of Fundamentals again.
The question whether
extrinsic right-duty constellations
'exist' (in a normative sense) does not depend on any particular
first-order normative doctrine or type of doctrine, and can
be dealt with here. Being a normative, not an ontological,
issue, their 'existence' is a question of their justification.
It is this justification which must, by definition, not rest on
one or more principles paradigmatic of a particular doctrine or
class of doctrines.
The only feasible kind of justificatory principle left over is, then, a
metadoctrinal principle.
But how is this to be interpreted?
To find that out, we have to return to some of the basics of our
triadic,
hierarchical ontology.
A theory or doctrine is in some way a whole of propositions
or (when expressed) utterances, factual or potential.
This means that a hierarchy of doctrinal levels can be constructed parallel
but not identical to that of
propositional levels.
A first-order theory is, then, a theory about nondoctrinal reality, that
is, nonpropositional reality and propositional reality insofar as it
is not doctrinal. If such a theory is descriptive or factual, it
is primarily a theory about (what are believed to be) facts; if
normative, then about (what are believed to be) norms. Now, just
as a second-order proposition is not necessarily a proposition
about one or more first-order propositions only, so a second-order
theory is not necessarily a theory about one or more
first-order theories only: it may also be a theory about the
relationship between (something in) first-order doctrinal reality
and (something in) nonpropositional or nondoctrinal reality.
And just as the correspondence theory of truth deals with the
relationship between a first-order proposition and nonpropositional
reality on the second propositional level, so we can
conceive of a 'metadoctrine' on the second doctrinal level
dealing with the relationship between a first-order doctrine and
nondoctrinal reality, or something in nondoctrinal reality.
When this 'something' is the very person holding the first-order
doctrine, and when this (non-metadoctrinal) doctrine is a
normative one, the relationship in question becomes unique in
the context of extrinsic right-duty constellations. If the
second-order doctrine about the relationship between people and
first-order normative doctrines is itself descriptive, it is
about their theories, ideas and ideologies, that is, a psychological,
sociological or anthropological study. If it is normative,
however, it is about the first-order normative theory or
ideology people ought or ought not to adhere to, or
have or have not the right to adhere to.
Two things should have become clear now: firstly, that the
principles typical of a second-order normative doctrine are
metadoctrinal; and secondly, that the notion of person is
crucial in this context. Of course, a metadoctrinal principle is
also a 'doctrinal' principle, just as a metatheory is also a
theory. What counts is that we can, and if necessary do,
differentiate metadoctrinal and non-metadoctrinal, doctrinal
principles. Thus when we contrast doctrinal and
metadoctrinal, doctrinal is short for first-order
doctrinal.
The significance of the notion of person need not surprise
us. Basic rights have been derived before from the necessary
conditions for purposive action. As conditions 'choice' and
'capability' have been mentioned. By itself this could still be
interpreted in a broader sense also covering nonpersonal animals
with interests. This, however, cannot be done with the classical
foundation of natural rights on the equality of all people as
rational beings (rather than as beings with needs, desires or
interests). Nonpropositional beings, such as rational beings or
people, do only have some typical relationship with propositional
beings, such as normative doctrines, as rational beings, that
is, as people. This is what distinguishes them in this respect
from mere human beings, mere animal beings or mere beings with
needs, desires or interests.
