9.4.2 |
AN EQUAL SHARE IN ALL OTHER THINGS
NOT PERSON-MADE |
To determine the implications of
the right to personhood
with respect to property we, firstly, need not, and must not,
make any assumption about the value or disvalue of individual or
private property in other things than the bodies of people.
Every such assumption would be alien to the nature of
the extrinsic right-duty constellation.
Secondly, we need not, and must not, make any assumption about the person
in question being a citizen of a state or not:
'e may be stateless, 'e may live in an
anarchic (democratic) community, 'e may live in a totalitarian (democratic)
state, or somewhere in between; this is not of normative significance,
metadoctrinally speaking.
It requires one or more
doctrinal principles to justify a
certain amount of private property, or to maximize it as much as possible,
or to minimize it as much as possible. And it requires one or more
doctrinal principles to justify a communal or societal organization
with a certain role and function, or to maximize that role,
or to minimize that role. Even when someone wants to argue that
a certain kind of state is the best institution to guarantee an
active, discretionary right like the right to personhood to its
citizens, this argument itself, which must be based on one or
more axioms and empirical assumptions, is one among several
others and cannot be granted any special status.
All living people should be respected equally as persons:
this is the metadoctrinal, normative foundation of the system of
extrinsic property rights too.
It is a dictum which transcends
all divergent ideas on empirical reality, on morality itself, on
the role of the state (if any) and on the status of individual
or private property. Now, how can such a theoretical conception,
or rather lack of any (doctrinal) conception, explain what
people's moral rights to property are? Well, it may often not
explain what people's particular property rights are, with the
notable exception of the right in their own bodies, but it does
have a strong impact as a double-edged principle: on the one
hand, it creates or extends property rights which on a doctrinal
view would have been nonexisting or more limited, and on the
other hand, it partially or completely annuls other so-called
'property rights' which on a doctrinal view would have existed
or would have been more extensive. (These doctrinal views
include the belief that one always would have moral reasons to
obey the law of the land, and not just legal or prudential
ones.)
If living people are indeed respected personally, they all
have an equal initial right or share in all things which are not
made by anyone personally. Thus they have an equal initial right
(that is, an initial right to an equal value) in all land which
is not person-made --'man-made' or 'anthropogenic', as it has
traditionally been called. (A clear example of land which is not
person-made is a nature reserve; a clear example of land which
is person-made is a polder reclaimed from the sea.) All living
people who have never sold, given away or otherwise personally
alienated any land in their lives own the same portion of all
land which is in private hands if, and insofar as, it has not
been created by people (and assuming that they have not 'bought'
or 'received' such land from still-living other people, in which
case they own more if the former owners were rightful owners on
the same principle). Furthermore, the same people have an equal
share in all land which belongs to the community or society of
which they are members. (If this ownership is not rightful, the
share of the individuals is the same nevertheless relative to
the total amount of land,
altho the total amount
may be too small or too big in comparison with other communities or
societies.)
What applies to land as a natural element, applies to all
natural resources. And also in this case the proportion between
individual and communal, or between private and collective,
ownership is of no import whatsoever. The sole thing that
counts is that, before anyone personally alienates a part of
'er property or share, everyone has an
equal right to property in natural land and resources, and an equal share
in natural land and resources which is held in common.
If there is no private property at all, then everyone has an equal share in
everything that is not produced by anyone personally; and if everything
that is not produced by anyone personally is in private hands,
then everyone owns the same amount of property unless 'e
personally alienates or has alienated it to a still-living
person, or unless 'e personally has bought or received it from
a still-living person; or part of it. (Since the 'sale' or
'gift' of land or a quantity of natural resources is only
rightful so long as both the seller or donor and the buyer or
beneficiary stay alive, it is probably better to speak of a case
of 'granting a loan' or 'renting', altho the loan or rental may
be irrevocable.)
Even the private property right in a non-person-made thing, or in a thing
to the extent in which it is not person-made, is a share in the
total amount of private property in non-person-made things, or in things to
the extent in which they are not person-made.
For private property of this kind automatically becomes less when the
number of living people increases, or when the amount of land, or some
other such natural resource, held in private hands decreases (for other
reasons than that there are people who sell it or give their portion or
part of it to the community or state).
And it automatically becomes more when the
total population decreases, or when the amount of private land
increases. Should this sound impractical, this will be a reason
to always hold enough of the land in common, so that part of it
can be privatized when the population increases (assuming that
not all land is held in common). In that case the size of the
private lots does not have to change. Of course, in
practise, numerous other
arrangements are possible, like compensation in money for those who have
a smaller or no portion, if, and so long as, they agree to the
arrangement.
The idea of an absolute right in land or natural resources
independent of the number of living persons is a product of
fallacious, doctrinal speculation. No-one can have such a right
to a piece of land larger than the area occupied by 'er own
body. Land (particularly fertile or unspoiled land) and natural
resources are either scarce, so that not enough and as good are
left over (in the event that a person takes more than 'er
share), or they are not, but also then a person must not use
more of it than 'er share. If other people do not use their
share, this is their extrinsic right (even when they cannot use
it). To tell them to use it, and how to use it, is to force
doctrinal tenets upon them, and this is precisely what the right
to personhood does not allow. Absolutist theorists on property
who claim that one human being or family could have the right in
a piece of land with fixed boundaries, inclusive of its natural
resources, and that 'e or they could freely devise such an
estate, flagrantly violate other people's right to personhood
(especially when the population increases). And they flagrantly
violate the rights of future persons still unborn. Not only is
the right in a natural element never absolute, but always
somehow a share, a person cannot even conceptually have the
right to devise land or resources which are not person-made. 'E
can sell or rent them, give them away or lend them, but it does
remain a share 'e deals with. This share terminates the moment
'e dies, and therefore it is not possible to devise such land or
natural resources. A human being cannot properly sell or give
away something 'e does not own, or something 'e does not own
anymore at the moment of transference for other reasons than
expressed in 'er will.
Living people who do not own land or natural resources, altho
there is natural land, and altho there are natural resources,
privately owned, have an extrinsic right to an income, unless
they have explicitly and voluntarily sold or given away their
share in the land and natural resources. This right is an active
('negative'), not a passive ('positive') right, because the income
is a compensation for the fact that their extrinsic right is
infringed upon, since they have less or nothing of these things.
The income should restore their equality as persons. But they
must agree to such a compensation. (Therefore the right to the
income may also be conceived of as a special right.) If they do
not agree, they still have an equal right to the actual land and
resources. Not recognizing their equal property in the land and
resources, if, and insofar as, they are not person-made, is
plain theft. There is no difference in this respect between what
is possessed privately and what is possessed collectively. All
living people also have an equal share in the land and resources
held by the state, or held by a state. That state has to pay
them money for this share, either periodically (in which case it
is an income) or at once; or else, it has to provide them with
certain services. And, again, the living person who has never
sold or otherwise alienated 'er share, must agree to such a
deal. If not, then 'e continues to have an equal property in the
actual land and resources.
As has already been explained in our discussion of social and economic
rights
--section 8.3.3-- the income a person may
derive from 'er share in all things (other than people's bodies) which are
not person-made is not a 'basic' or 'minimum income' which would,
by definition, be sufficient for a 'fully human life', a 'decent living' or
something of the sort.
The amount of money a person may receive as compensation for 'er share may
vary from nothing when there is no land (or water) privately owned, and
when the land or waters which are collectively owned are not developed
or exploited at all, to an amount so large that 'e does not feel the need
to work (for more luxuries), when most land is privately owned (by others)
and/or when the land or waters which are collectively owned are
industriously developed or exploited (also by others).
On the metadoctrinal view it does
not matter how high the income from 'er share in the natural
resources actually is; in practise it may be a question of
bargaining. What counts here is the respect for the rights of
personhood involved with regard to property. This does not only
concern people's power to sell or lease their property, to grant
temporary use of it or to give it away, it also concerns their
power to exclude nonowners from their property, whether it be a private
citizen or an employee of a governmental agency.
