TRINPsite: Book of Symbols: The Concept of the Supreme Being

3.1.1 THE CONCEPT OF (THE) SUPREME BEING

According to the principle of catenated neutrality, the neutral predicate of a catena extensionality has, in the first instance, the highest normative value. Let us assume that c_i is the catena value for catena I, and that n_i is the normative value. The principle of neutrality does not tell how n_i relates to c_i, but one possibility is that n_i = 1 / ( |c_i| + 1). In that case c_i = 0 and n_i = 1 for neutrality (the highest normative value), and c_i ¹ 0 and n_i < 1 for unneutrality (the same for equally unneutral, negative and positive catena values). Now, let us also assume that v_j is the overall normative value of a primary thing J, or of a combined state of being J, based on the normative value of the catenated predicates of the thing or state of being in question. We do not know how v_j relates to the values n_i,j (that is n_i for J), but here too the function has to fulfil a number of requirements. One function which does fulfil these requirements is v_j = P n_i,j (that is, v_j = n_1,j * n_2,j * n_3,j ... ). According to this function the thing or things with the highest or supreme value are those with value 1 (the same normative value as for one single form of ananicity). A state of being with the normative value 1 is then the highest, or supreme, state of being.

In the Book of Fundamentals (F.3.1.6) it was pointed out that there is no empirically given 'neutral' longitude, latitude or altitude in a three-dimensional spatial universe, altho the norm of neutrality does apply to the corresponding catenas. Even the hypothesis of mean-neutrality does not give us an empirical clue in this respect. Yet, there is one thing we can tell from the applicability of the norm of neutrality to the basic spatial catenas, and that is that, so far as spatiotemporal things are concerned, there can only be one thing that is neutral in this respect; at least if we agree that there can only be one object or spatiotemporal thing at a place at a time. (The adjective spatiotemporal is, strictly speaking, superfluous because non-spatiotemporal things cannot be at any place.) There may not be a fixed 'tri-neutral' point in the universe, any supreme spatiotemporal being, that is, any being that is (also) supreme in the spatiotemporal respect, must be located at the tri-neutral point, whether this point is fixed or flexible. This means that there can only be one such supreme spatiotemporal being, because its value v_j < 1, if it is not neutral with respect to one of the three spatial catenas. It does not mean that there must be such a thing. The symbolic importance of this deduction is that one can rightfully speak of "the supreme being", for if a supreme being is an object, there is only one of it, that is, one supreme object. If it is not an object (whether or not in addition to a supreme being which is), there is no need to use the plural. In that case it is more appropriate to speak of "a supreme state of being" or of "supreme being".

The unique primary thing located at the theoretically tri-neutral point in the three-dimensional spatial universe is, or would be, the supreme being if it also is, or was, neutral in all other ananormative respects in which it is catenal. Only then is its total, combined normative value 1. Should it be noncatenal in a number of respects, its combined value is still 1. All we can say is that the supreme being is and/or should not be unneutrally catenal in any ananormative respect, and not whether it is neutral instead of noncatenal. However, since the supreme being is and/or should be neutral or ananic for all catenical aspects where it is catenal, it may be called "the all-neutral or all-ananic being". (This is not a proper name but a definite description.) Of the two terms all-neutral and all-ananic the latter one is much more accurate for two reasons: firstly, the supreme is, strictly speaking, not 'neutral' but neutrally catenal; and secondly, the supreme is not neutrally catenal with respect to all catenas but (if catenal at all) only with respect to catenas to which the principle of catenated neutrality actually applies. The 'all-neutral' supreme being is not neutral with respect to modulus, and other factitiously derived, catenas, for instance.

Since the supreme is neutral with respect to basic catenas (granted that it is catenal with respect to these catenas), bicatenal bivariant difference-catenality is not applicable to it in a factual sense, even tho bicatenal bivariant equality is ananormatively superior. It can be argued that the supreme should be equal to every primary thing, because every primary thing that is catenal in the same respect should be equal to the supreme. But it cannot be argued that the supreme actually is equal to every other primary thing, whether that thing is neutral or not, and therefore perhaps nonsupreme, in the basic respect. Equality may be superior to inequality, it is better that the supreme is not equal to an inferior being than that it is equal to it. By speaking of "the supreme" we are not simply referring to any being, as the concept of bicatenal bivariant difference-catenality implies. The supreme has then already been defined in terms of the basic catena. Altho this definition does not seem to be of any real significance in the spatiotemporal field (for there is no neutral-directed force aimed at some absolute tri-neutral point, so far as we know) it must be taken into account if our symbolism is to be (as) consistent (as possible). This is not to say that gravitation, as the relative nanaic force in the spatiotemporal field, would not be expressive of what furthers ananormative supremeness. It is only that the relationship between the concept of supremeness (which also applies to systems of primary things) and the concept of a supreme being (which is only one primary thing), or between normative and factual conditions, is more complicated in the case of bicatenal bivariant difference-catenality.

We have not proved that the supreme exists; and we have not proved, and will not prove, that the supreme being is literally neutral or ananic in every respect, or in every ananormative respect. What is symbolically important — it was the purpose of this section — is that the concept of a supreme being, or of supreme being, can be deduced in our neutralistic catenical model.