3.1.2 |
ITS QUALITIES, IF CATENAL |
When speaking of "the supreme being" it is first
necessary to discuss some spatiotemporal aspects of this being. In
the last resort, this is the way to distinguish a spatiotemporal
primary thing
which is supreme from other primary things.
Maybe, some will argue that the supreme being, even if it is
spatiotemporal, need not be at one place, but could be omnipresent or
immanent in the whole of reality. If such a contention is to
make sense at all, then those who argue this must confuse the
notion of being supreme with the notion of supreme being. Any
primary thing in the world that is
ananic in a certain respect
is supreme in that respect, and thus partakes of supremeness.
But this having of a
primary predicate
which is neutral is quite
something else than being a part of something that is neutrally
catenal.
Moreover, a
neutral predicate (whether or
not supreme) is not something spatiotemporal, nor does having a neutral
predicate make something spatiotemporal. We had therefore better
forget about an omnipresent or immanent, supreme being.
It is only
the norm of neutrality itself, the
supremeness of ananicity and non-spatiotemporal supreme being which
may be said to be 'omnipresent' in a more or less literary sense.
The principle of catenated neutrality
does not apply to the predicates of temporal auxiliary series.
(See
F.3.1.5.)
Therefore it is not the case that the supreme being would only exist
at one supposedly 'neutral' moment in time. Yet, if we would
like to treat time as space, we could say that the present
moment is the neutral moment, and that the supreme being only
exists 'now'.
Altho the supreme
being does, then, have no past and no future, it will in
practise exist
always (if existing at all), for the
catenization concerned shifts
as time proceeds.
If we say that the supreme exists only one moment, it
simply cannot move. But even if we say that it exists always, it
does not move either, for the all-ananic remains at the tri-neutral point
forever. Rest is neutrality, and motion as
unneutrality is alien to the supreme being. Nonetheless, motion is
relative in practise and the all-ananic may actually change
position with respect to a nonuniversal system of reference,
that is, with respect to any other system. This is the case for
example, if the tri-neutral point is flexible and only based on
the location of the supreme being itself. (Compare the neutral
present point which would only be based on the flexible moment
of supreme existence.) Since the all-neutral being is at rest
with regard to the theoretical, universal frame of reference, it
could be called "extremely slow".
This extremely positive form of catenality is that of the slowness
catena, however, and
the ananorm does not assign the
highest normative value to the neutralities of catenas such as the slowness
catena (which is a
modulus catena).
While the principle of neutrality does not apply to temporal
series of auxiliary predicates, it does not apply to normative
series of auxiliary predicates either. Insofar as goodness
and badness are purely normative or evaluative concepts, the
supreme being is all-good (or maximally good) by definition.
It is then the norm of neutrality which determines that
all-good stands for all-ananic, for (all-)goodness in
itself is still devoid of any substance. But good can also be used
in the factual sense of beneficent and bad in the sense of
maleficent. Goodness is, then, the quality of giving rise to
the increase of a
happiness-catenary value, and
badness the quality of giving rise to the decrease of that value. In that
case the all-ananic is neither good nor bad, because the
supreme being makes other beings neither happier nor unhappier.
Both change and causing change are unneutral and the supreme
being does not cause change, neither for the worse nor for the
better.
Hence, the all-ananic has no destructive or creative powers.
It did not even create life, for instance —not even in a symbolic
fashion— because the creation of life, where no life has been
terminated or terminates in the same period, would signify an increase in
the number of living beings.
(This is not to say that the coming into being of life could not be
nanaic for reasons not related to
the number of living beings.)
The all-ananic never destroyed life either, because the destruction of
life would signify suffering and a decrease in the number of living beings
or the destruction of a natural balance.
These are positive and negative predicates the supreme being
does not have, and does not cause to have. So far as life is
concerned, the supreme being symbolizes the maintenance of the
neutrally good life and of the balance of life.
Every honor and dishonor are alien to the nature of the all-ananic:
it does not honor nor dishonor; and it is not honored nor dishonored.
If the all-ananic assigned a cultural or social value at all to other
things,
'e would only assign the limit
value which is neither low nor high.
Similarly, the supreme being itself can only be treated in accordance with
the assignment of a value which is neither low nor high.
We have to clearly distinguish the fact that it has the highest
ananormative value from the fact
that it would be treated in an exclusive manner as a being with the highest
cultural or social status, that is, from the fact that it would be honored.
Since the supreme being can solely be treated in a neutral manner, it can
neither be honored nor dishonored.
Also if the supreme being exists, there is no person in the universe who
honors or dishonors
'im or it.
Every purported veneration or worshiping of the supreme being is
really the veneration or worshiping of an inferior being, for
example, of an image of the supreme being, or of material
attributes, living beings, people or institutions associated
with that image.
What applies to honor and dishonor, applies to love and
hatred. No-one loves or hates the supreme being; it is the image
of the supreme being, or another inferior thing, which is loved
or hated. Conversely, the supreme being 'imself or itself loves
or hates no-one and nothing either. If catenal in this respect,
it is ananic with regard to all of us, and with regard to all
others.
