2.5.1 |
THOUGHT-RELATED BUT NOT DENOMINATIONAL |
2.5.1.1
THE ADJECTIVES ABSENT
When they claim that he is
the greatest thinker of all times,
be on your guard,
for he may only be
the greatest exclusivist thinker,
or the greatest thinker
of their own sort of ethnic culture,
they are referring to.
When they claim that he is
the first modern thinker,
be on your guard,
for he may only be
the first modern monotheist thinker,
or the first modern thinker
of their own species,
they are referring to.
When they forget or conceal
the adjectives of exclusivism,
be on your guard,
for there is no inclusive thinker
who is claimed to be
the greatest of all times
and whose thought is ethnocentric,
anthropocentric or theocentric.
When they forget or conceal
the adjectives of exclusivism,
select the pronouns of masculinity,
they have not yet reached
the vantage point of the Norm,
and it is, then,
no catenical or relevant thought
they are referring to.
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By saying that discrimination because of the
denominational or political
ideology someone adheres to is a standard example of thought-related
person-centered
exclusivism (as we did in
2.4.1), a number of classificational levels
of thought-related
exism have already been skipped.
Following our typification of thought itself (as expounded in
I.6.1) the two kinds of thought-related
exclusivism to be distinguished first are
disciplinary and
nondisciplinary thought-related exclusivism (X.78 & 79).
The two kinds of disciplinary thought-related exclusivism to be
distinguished next are then (inter)ideological exclusivism (X.156)
and nonideological disciplinary exclusivism (X.157).
And, as we have also differentiated
comprehensive ideology or
denominationalism and
specialist ideology from the
beginning on, interideological exclusivism is either specialist ideological
or denominational exclusivism (X.312 & 313).
The branch of specialist ideological exclusivism of which discrimination
because of someone's political convictions is an
active
affirmative
manifestation is politico-ideological exclusivism (X.625).
When speaking of "the discrimination", "exclusion" or
"preferential treatment" of people on the grounds of the political
or denominational ideology they espouse, or on the grounds of any
other thought they may have, the irrelevance of the distinction
between them and others is already presupposed in the use of
discrimination, exclusion and preferential treatment.
This is especially important when the thing rejected, or conceived of
as inferior, is not a person or group of people, but a
particular thought or system of thought. Whereas it may not be
relevant to make a distinction between people on the basis of
their thoughts, it may be 'highly relevant' to make a distinction
between these thoughts or systems of thought themselves.
Thus, it is on the grounds of the principle of
discriminational relevance itself that
irrelevantist systems of thought are inferior in a normative sense.
Hence, we have every reason not to associate ourselves with them, since we
have an inclusivistic alternative.
Yet, this does by no means imply that we would have
a reason to always reject a whole person who thinks in
exclusivist terms.
To reject a person as person
'e would have to impinge upon
our own or someone else's
right to personhood.
So long as no right of personhood is impinged on, it should be
possible for every inclusivist to coexist with an exist.
For us as adherents of a denominational doctrine, the prime
mover of all exclusivist matter is thought-related subanthropic
exism on the basis of someone else`s denominational convictions
or someone`s own denominational presuppositions. Yet, before
dealing with the basics of this manifestation of ideological
exism, we should briefly discuss the manifestations of
thought-related subanthropic exism which are not denominational first.
Formally speaking, those nondenominational manifestations are
not only the specialist ideological ones, but also nondisciplinary
and nonideological, disciplinary thought-related exism and
even disciplinary and ideological, thought-related exism in
general. (In this sense, exclusivisms which are not denominational
encompass denominational exism: they need not be undenominational.)
Nonetheless, we shall confine ourselves to
politico-ideological exclusivism.
The
unitary manifestation of
politico-ideological person-centered exclusivism is exism re someone
or people distinguished on the basis of
'er or their belonging to a
politico-ideological group.
The comparison is, then, not with people of other political groups, as in
the case of the
compositional manifestation of it, but with
people distinguished on the basis of other ideological or nonideological
characteristics.
If
aggrandizemental and
sentimental, unitary, that is,
interfactorial, politico-ideological
exism becomes manifest in an exclusive or disproportionate attention for,
or preoccupation with, people distinguished on the basis of their belonging
to a political group.
Typical of this exism is a preoccupation with
the persecution or discrimination of people on account of their
political affiliation as distinct from the persecution or
discrimination of people on other grounds. For example, to call
a society "a free society" merely because people are not persecuted
for, or discriminated against on the basis of, their political
convictions, is only one instance of interfactorial
politico-ideological exism. (To call it "a free society" because people
are not persecuted for their religious convictions either is
only an instance of a little bit broader type of interfactorial
ideological exism.)
The minimum society that may be called "free" in this respect is a society
in which people are not discriminated against on the basis of their
(ideological) convictions in any way, whether these convictions are
political or nonpolitical, religious or nonreligious, and whether in an
affirmative way, in an
exemplary way or by means of the state`s
phraseology and symbolism, that is, in an
intermediary way.
Infrafactorial politico-ideological
exism has been classified as "compositional" because the 'thought' to
which it is related may be of several types.
Firstly, it may be a political doctrine
in the strict, theoretical sense. Political doctrine-related
(person-centered) exclusivism (X.1251) is, then, exism re someone
or people adhering to a particular political doctrine, or re
a characteristic concomitant with adherence to such a doctrine
(but not re that doctrine itself).
Secondly, the 'thought' concerned may be that of a political party,
however inconsistent or opportunistic.
Thus, political party-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2501) is
exism re someone or people sympathizing with a certain political party, or
re a characteristic quality of members or sympathizers of such a party.
The worst form of party-related exclusivism is apparently the ideological
exclusionism of a one-party state, that is, a country in which only one
political party is permitted and recognized.
Like the one-religion state, and like the one-race or one-family state, the
one-party state is a political abomination, yet it is not necessarily the
case that the politico-ideological exclusivism of the leaders in such a
polity is worse than the brand of exclusivism (if that is the case)
demonstrated by a multi-party system in which only one party is banned.
It could be that the one party in a particular one-party state happens to
admit of a greater internal diversity of opinions than the two or so legal
parties manage to represent in a particular multi-party state.
Here, we touch on the complicated subject of 'democracy', that is,
democracy not only for those with whom the members of the current regime
generally agree but also for those with whom they substantially disagree,
and a democracy not skewed in favor of the titled, rich or literate but
one for the untitled, poor or illiterate as well.
Altho we cannot
discuss this subject further here, it is obvious
--also from our brief discussion of it in
the previous chapter--
that politico-ideological exclusivism is certainly not the only
manifestation to be blamed where democracy has failed.
There have always been, or still are, people in power who exclude, or try
to exclude or discredit, fellow citizens on the basis of many other factors
than the political ideology they adhere to. One such factor, and
a most important one, is their denominational belief. This
factor does not only concern the denominational convictions they
used to have in the past, it concerns not less the ones they
presently have, and the ones they will have in the future.
