3.4.4 |
THE PRINCIPLE OF BENEFICENCE |
So far as
happiness-catenals and their
situations are concerned, a neutralistic hatred of pain or unhappiness is
an unconditional one, and so is a neutralistic love of good,
neutral situations; but a
neutralistic love of pleasure or happiness is a conditional one. It is an
intrinsic duty to improve the
situations of human or other sentient beings when these situations
are not good in a neutral sense. Improving these situations is
nanaic, and striving for their
improvement
anafactive.
Where there is pain and suffering, because human or other
sentient beings find themselves in a deteriorating or bad
situation, it is an intrinsic duty to alleviate or relieve the
pain and suffering of these happiness-catenals. Where there is
pleasure or contentment, because human or other sentient beings
find themselves in a situation which is ameliorating or good in
neutral terms, we may be satisfied as well.
To promote the well-being of happiness-catenals and to take
away their pain and suffering is 'doing or producing good' in
traditional terms. In other words, the duty to be anafactive
with respect to their bad situations, and with respect to their
unhappiness, is a duty to be beneficent. Beneficence is
nothing else than
intentional anafaction of the
situational type.
The
motivational value corresponding
to it is benevolence, that is, the disposition to be beneficent.
If happiness and situational
neutralization are indeed inseparable, beneficence in the
sense of situational anafaction need not differ much from
utilitarian happiness or utility in
practise (except
in the marginal cases discussed earlier). Also other nonutilitarians have
often explicitly recognized a (semi-)utilitarian principle of
beneficence besides, for example, a nonutilitarian 'principle of
just distribution'. In this way it was, and still is, possible
to incorporate that part of utilitarianism which is most
convincing. One ethical theorist has correctly pointed out that
the principle of beneficence is 'the more basic principle' which
must underlie the principle of utility. This latter principle
(that one should bring about the greatest possible balance of
eudaimonist good over eudaimonist evil) emphasizes that one
ought to do good and to prevent or avoid harm.
Since the realization of the ideal to do only good, and not to do any harm,
is often practically impossible, one is in those instances that it is
impossible forced to bring about the best possible balance of good over
evil — it is argued.
This argument amounts to exactly the same as what has
been said above: not the total or average value (utility in this
case) is the ultimate one but each individual value. In this
respect individualized forms of consequentialism (which are
still identity-independent, however) are much more plausible
than an individuality-denying form of consequentialism such as
utilitarianism.
It has been suggested that it follows from the principle of
beneficence, firstly, that 'one ought not to inflict harm';
secondly, that 'one ought to prevent harm'; thirdly, that 'one
ought to remove what is bad'; and fourthly, that 'one ought to
do or promote good'. On such an account the reason to be
beneficent is in neutralistic terms that one ought not to worsen
any human or other sentient being's situation, or to make it
unhappy (the minimum requirement of
nonactivating neutralism);
that one ought to prevent that this happens; that one ought to
improve such a being's situation, if it is unhappy, and if its
situation is not good in a neutral sense; and that one ought to
improve such a being's situation, if its situation is not good
in a neutral sense even when it does not feel unhappy (the
severest requirement of
activating neutralism).
For utilitarians utility, and therefore beneficence, is a
duty in all respects (that is, if they use the term duty at
all); for many antiutilitarian deontologists beneficence is
only something supererogatory, or if not beneficence in general,
at least the normative condition that one ought to do or promote
good. The deontological tendency to lift beneficence beyond the
call of duty may be a very convenient one, the idea of a
supererogatory duty is an artificial device which only blocks or
hampers the operation of a
doctrinal principle.
It is the dire consequence, firstly, of confusing the doctrinal
aspect of morality with the
metadoctrinal one; and secondly,
of neglecting or ignoring the activating interpretation of doctrinal
principles. From a metadoctrinal angle every doctrinal or intrinsic
duty which requires more than noninterference is, indeed, in a
sense 'supererogatory', but the principle of beneficence is a
doctrinal principle, and we are not in this context concerned with
extrinsic considerations.
From a doctrinal angle it does make quite a difference whether the duty
connected with the principle of beneficence is activating or nonactivating.
But to say that it can be either activating or nonactivating is
something else than saying that it must definitely be
nonactivating. It is precisely in the latter case that every
anafactive (or 'positive') action becomes 'supererogatory' without
further ado. In the former case, however, the activating
duty always remains, if not in the foreground, at least in the
background.
Moreover, even where it concerns the activating interpretation of the
duty of beneficence, there is no reason to hold that the moral agent's
or decision-maker's
modal condition
would not count anymore. Nor is there a reason to hold that all
happiness-catenals would be subject to equally intense feelings
of happiness and unhappiness, and that they would all experience
the same conditions in the same way. (Here we touch on issues
whose treatment, or partial treatment, we will have to postpone
until
the chapter on life and nonlife.)
The principle of utility is not part of the neutralistic
doctrine, because we do not believe in sum totals which are
ultimate, and because we do not believe in happiness as
a perfective value.
Yet, where we do strive for the minimization
of unhappiness, and the improvement of situations (an improvement
which probably will be accompanied by happiness), utility
can indeed play a role. This role, however, lies only in the way
it deals with the practical application of the principle of
beneficence where beneficence in one respect is maleficence in
another. The fact that one and the same act can do good here and
harm there is a contingent, empirical one, and also therefore
utility does not belong to a normative doctrine as an ultimate
value. But when trying to implement what such a doctrine
prescribes, it is evidently a very important factual-modal
condition to take into account, and we, too, will have to do
this. Thus on the whole only that action may be regarded as
nanaic which produces more situational amelioration than
deterioration (and which does not cause more unhappiness than
happiness). This is a rule which does not only apply to the different
situations of different happiness-catenals; it also applies to
the situations of one and the same happiness-catenal at different
times. Where it is sure or probable that the betterment of a
catenal's situation in the short term is substantially greater
or smaller than the worsening of its situation in the long term,
or vice versa, only that action must be regarded as nanaic which
yields more situational betterment than worsening over the whole
life-time of the catenal in question.
In theory it is the well-being of all happiness-catenals at all times
which matters, but in practise the anafactive agent has, of course,
limited means and a limited knowledge of what the effects of
'er action will be. This may be
a reason to pay special attention to situations 'here and now', yet it
can never be a reason to pay no attention to situations far away in other
parts of the world or in the future, for it is often the case
that one can be quite sure that one's actions will be beneficent,
or for that matter maleficent, to foreign peoples or
future generations. And where there is insufficient guarantee
that the distant effects of one's action will be beneficial
ones, it is not seldom possible to first exert one's influence
to get such a guarantee, or to make these effects probable. Such
action, too, is, if not nanaic, at least anafactive.
Utilitarianism (and indirectly also theories of beneficence
and well-being) is a much favored instrument of
exclusivist
sociobiologists and other ideologues of
naturalness who would
like to get rid of certain groups of human beings, or certain
kinds of human phenomena or policies, altogether. (Particularly,
the equality of men and women and of hetero- and homosexuals
are thorns in their flesh.) Rather than callously appealing to
some ancient, sacred book that commands the extermination and
subjugation of certain minorities and (near-)majorities, they
prefer a more 'objective' approach to warrant their attitude by
arguing that the human beings concerned 'must be' unhappy, or
that the phenomena or policies at issue cause such unhappiness.
(The 'pleasant resemblance' between a religious book
of the brand in question and utilitarianism is that neither one
recognizes an independent
right to personhood.)
There may be numerous objections against any assumption that
certain groups of human beings would be, or would have to be,
unhappy (or more unhappy than other groups), or that certain
kinds of human phenomena or policies would on balance cause more
unhappiness than happiness (or more than other phenomena or
policies), that is, even in a society in which no-one would be
discriminated against. This is an 'empirical' issue we cannot
deal with here,
altho such an
assumption betrays more of the human being doing the assuming
him- or herself than of the reality talked about.
The informative point is, first of
all, that beneficence in its activating form requires that the
situations of people, or groups of people, who 'are so unlucky
to be unhappy' be improved. Secondly, so far as the phenomena
themselves are concerned, one must even from a purely utilitarian
point of view not only look at people's state of being happy
or unhappy, but also at their real or potential contribution to
happiness and unhappiness in general. Perhaps, people who are
creative, physically less aggressive and more critical of what
the majority presumably have always believed to be normal are on
the average also unhappier. But, perhaps, it is also these very same
unhappy people who create more beautiful things, who cause less
misery to others, and who are more likely to discover what has
made human beings unhappy in the past, or to ascertain what will
not make them happy anymore in the future. Naturally, to simply
take all these things for granted would not be less exclusivistic,
and our own prejudgment shall be neither
abnegational nor
aggrandizemental. What leaves
utilitarianism in a sad state here is that in reality it is often not
even the principle of utility which counts; what often seems to have the
greatest weight instead is a utilitarian's or pseudo-utilitarian's own
personal preference for the one empirical presupposition over the other.
Altho the principle of utility is preceded by a principle of
beneficence, neither utility nor beneficence is a perfective
value for us.
Beneficence is situational anafaction and therefore a
corrective-instrumental value.
It is well-being which is the situational perfective value.
Hence we speak of
"a norm of well-being" and not of some "norm of
beneficence". The formulation of such a norm would merely suggest that
beneficence itself were an ultimate or perfective value, and this would
only support those who have claimed that it is good that there is
evil in the world, so that people are able to show their
benevolence by means of good deeds.
According to the norm of neutrality it is the situations of people or
sentient beings which have primary significance and, not being ends in
themselves, good deeds are of secondary importance.
Those who have recognized a principle of beneficence have
also argued that beneficence (and certainly utility) is not
enough, but that a proper morality also requires some principle
of distributive justice or equality. Just as the principle of
beneficence is roughly the equivalent of the norm of well-being,
so this latter principle of justice or equality is roughly the
equivalent of the so-called
'norm of interpersonal equality',
another subnorm of
the norm of neutrality. We are now going to
take a closer look at this equality and at what it is supposed
to mean in a social context.
