3.6.2 |
THE NORM OF NANHONORE |
Honor (or honoring) is a positive predicate, dishonor (or
dishonoring) a negative predicate, and the concatenate
neither-honoring-nor-dishonoring a neutral one. The
catena of honor,
the neutral limit-element and dishonor is the honor catena, a basic
catena. This catena has a duplicate: the catena of the positive
being-honored, the neutral neither-being-honored-nor-being-dishonored
and the negative being-dishonored, the
isorelative of
the basic catena. Unlike respect and unlike what is a good
reputation from a neutralistic standpoint, honor and dishonor do
not serve any neutral purpose. They merely contribute to the
establishment and maintenance of
extremist, or lesser
unneutralist, and
exclusivist institutions.
Therefore honor and dishonor are
ananormatively inferior predicates, and the
attitudes of honoring and dishonoring ananormatively inferior attitudes.
Altho
it makes quite a difference with regard to a decision-maker's
anafactiveness whether
'e honors or is honored,
and whether 'e dishonors or is dishonored, it makes no difference
at all in the light of the normativeness of being: honoring
and being-honored, or dishonoring and being-dishonored are
equally inferior. So, it is not the
neutrality of the active,
catenical aspect in isolation
which is ananormatively superior,
but the neutralities of both the active and the passive aspects
at once. We shall call the bineutrality which combines the two
limit-elements "nanhonore". (Pronounced as
nän|höno|ré
with ä as in the variants of stance,
höno as in the
variants of hono(u)r and é as in
we; with primary stress on the second syllable. The e is to
distinguish this term from nanhonor, which denotes the neutrality of
the active aspect only.)
When applying the ananorm specifically to
honor-catenary and
isorelative issues, it may be termed "the norm of nanhonore". As
a penultimate perfective value nanhonore entails that one should
not honor, nor dishonor; and that nothing (personal or not)
should be honored or dishonored. As an antepenultimate value
honor-catenary anafactiveness entails, first of all, that one
should not intentionally and knowingly honor or dishonor. It
also entails that one should not have honored or dishonored
oneself if one can prevent it, or to the extent that one can
prevent it. If it could be proved that a particular, personal or
nonpersonal, primary thing were superior according to the
ananorm itself, even then positive honoring would not be
conducive to less unneutrality, but would only add to it. If it
could be proved that a particular, personal or nonpersonal,
primary thing were inferior according to the ananorm, even then
negative dishonoring would not be conducive to less unneutrality
either, but would also then only add to it. Seen from the
perspective of the norm of nanhonore, no person or primary thing
is in itself honorable, and no person or primary thing is in
itself dishonorable.
We have clearly distinguished honor and dishonor from
respect and disrespect. The question might now arise why
the norm of neutrality does not apply to respect and disrespect in
the same way as it applies to honor and dishonor. The reason is
that respect itself is a conscious conformity with the
principles of the doctrine, and disrespect a deliberate violation of
these principles. Principles can be applicable to all kinds of
ground-world and
propositional things but not
to conformity with themselves; or, if they are, they can solely legitimize
such conformity. It is therefore that our
ideology allows respect,
and condemns disrespect, for people's right to
personhood;
allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for the
truth; allows
respect, and condemns disrespect, for
inclusivity; and allows
respect, and condemns disrespect, for
neutrality itself.
Just as there is a valid reason to differentiate respect
and honor, so there is a valid reason to differentiate
praise and honor, dependent on the definition of
praise and on the manner of praising. Where praise has degenerated
into glorification, worship and idolatry it is self-evident that it
is badly corrupted by strong, polar feelings of the honor-catenary
stripe. No doubt, it then offends against the norm of
nanhonore. But in its pure form to praise something is to
commend, to approve of or to express a favorable judgment of
something. Praising involves in this instance not the worship
of some doxastic authority but an evaluation of an attitude or
actions on the basis of independent norms or principles.
'Praiseworthy' is on such an account --again-- what accords
with the principles; and 'blameworthy' what deserves blame, because
one has found fault with it, also in terms of these principles.
In normative theories praiseworthiness and blameworthiness
are terms of ascription, that is, of ascribing praise for having
good motives or intentions, and blame for having bad motives or
intentions. They apply to people's attitude and behavior with
regard to normative principles, and obviously these normative
principles cannot be applicable to the kind of praise and blame
concerned themselves. Praising someone for living in accordance
with the subnorm of nanhonore, the supernorm of neutrality, or
any other principle of our ideology is therefore in itself not
anti-anafactive. It would become anti-anafactive if one praised
the one person and not the other who is equally praiseworthy. It
would become anti-anafactive, too, if one lost sight of all
proportionality in one's praising, for example, by creating or
allowing the existence of absolute differences where
the differences in merit (if any) are merely gradual.
A typical example of creating absolute differences --still
regardless of the principles, or lack of principles, on which it
is founded-- is the exclusive naming of objects, such as
streets, avenues, buildings, funds, towns, and so on, after
particular persons. (If literally every person had an object of
the same importance called after
'im, or of an importance
proportionate to
'er real praiseworthiness, it
would be a different matter altogether.)
The tasteless and unimaginative custom of calling objects after particular
persons is both anti-egalitarian and in defiance of the norm of nanhonore.
Moreover, as an
onomastic brand of exclusivity it can
be considered a lingual intermediary
operational manifestation of
nonphysical individual exclusivism, and
perhaps also familial exclusivism.
This is but one illustration of how intimately intertwined the norm of
neutrality and the norm of inclusivity are.
In this instance it is the ideals of onomastic
inclusivity and of nanhonore which coincide.
Whether it concerns the norm of inclusivity or the norm of nanhonore, in
both cases streets, buildings, funds, and so on, should be given
substantive names which are, for example, practical or educational.
Names may be used when praising people in an objective and inclusive
manner, they should never be used to honor, or for that matter,
dishonor people or personified beings. Those who would have
liked to, or who would have felt an urge to, call something
inter- or non-personal after a person, may call it after the
bineutral predicate of nanhonore instead. The way which would
otherwise have been prosaically named in honor of one particular
specimen will then be the Way of Nanhonore. For nanhonore is
the poetic
dao in the realm of neutrality,
in the realm of inclusivity.
